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ABSTRACT
Developing

a

Behavior Modification Safety Program
In

an

Industrial Setting

(September,

1978)

M, Consuelo de Santamar la, Professional

Psychologist,

Universidad Javeriana
Ed.D., University of Massachusetts

Directed by:

Professor Ena V. Nuttall

This study tested the effectiveness of

a

simple, minimal ly intru-

sive feedback-suggestion system on the reduction of safety hazards
industrial setting.

an

Eighteen hazardous conditions were assessed over 57

observation sessions, for a duration of
departments.

in

12

weeks, for six production

Baselines of varying lengths permitted replication across

the departments at different times.

This multiple-basel ine-across-subjects

experimental design served to control potential confounding variables such
as differential

reactivity to observational procedures and passage of time.

Intervention consisted of

a

"feedback package:"

presenting super-

visors with copies of the observation form, accompanied by

a

note which

congratulated good practices and suggested ways for improving safety
hazards, and occasionally comments from a senior executive.

The six

department supervisors were divided into. three conditions, depending on

the replication group;

Early Feedback, Middle Feedback and Late Feedback

condition,
The results indicated the effectiveness of this simple cost effi-

cient system.

Following intervention, hazard frequencies dropped 60^ on

the average across departments, with

a

range of 29^ to 83^ decrease.

V

starting with baseline peak ranges
from 20 to 55 hazards

each department, a more stable pattern was
observed after treatment with the
highest frequency reading 33.
Informal data suggested that the
intervention

affected the social ecology of the
system

in a

in

positive manner.

For

instance, supervisors appeared to accept
more responsibility for safe

practices, management became actively involved

the safety program,

in

communication problems among supervisors were
solved, and hazard prevention awareness among workers appeared to
increase.

The results were discussed
ioral

an

in

terms of interactions between behav-

intervention and organizational variables.

The need to incorporate

intervention program of this type within the organizational
structure

was stressed.

The role played by the feedback package was clear.

However,

the function of each of its constituent parts must await
future research.
It

was suggested that more complete independence of subjects
be maintained

in

future studies.

would control

Conducting replications at completely separate sites

for any spread of effects caused by communication or compe-

tition between subjects.

For future research to obtain a more valid

reflection of change after intervention,

a

weighted frequency system was

suggested as a means of measuring the dependent variable.

Also,

it

was

suggested that to promote maintenance of intervention, supervisory res-

ponsibilities should include the implementation of safety programs.
value of incorporating the workers more directly
was also discussed,

in

The

the safety program
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CHAPTER

I

INTRODUCTION AND REVIEW OF

RELATED LITERATURE

When we read about the large number of people that were
killed

In

the world wars, or the millions of human beings that have died
of famine
In

the recent history of particular countries, we cannot but feel over-

whelmed and appalled.

We wish history had developed differently and

naively believe "someone" should or could have stopped these events from
happening.

However, when we find out that the loss of life from Indus-

trial accidents has totaled many times the total number of people who

have died

In

wars (Blake,

1943) and that accidents are presently the

fourth cause of deaths for all ages after heart disease, cancer and

strokes (Accident Facts,
this case

^ are

change them, even

1977), we do not react similarly.

part of the "facts" and
If

not a social

^ could

still

Although

In

do something to

level, at least at an Individual

we feel very removed from these facts and think to ourselves:

level,

"It won't

happen to me, not at my Job, not In this town, etc."
For some reason or another, accident prevention and safety as such
do not appear as the obvious answer to modify not only the accident death

rate but also the amount of Injuries that disable 5^ of the American pop-

ulation every year.

Fortunately the safety pioneers firmly believed

accident and Injury rates could be lowered and their efforts have modified
the figures through the years.

Yet they are still as high as mentioned

above and they must be reduced further.

It

is

with this Intention that

2

the following research was carried out:

to try to find an effective

procedure to further reduce the number of hazards and
thus the amount of
accidents,

In an

area where control of such conditions cannot be fully

exerted by the Individual and where
occur:

a

large number of accidents still

the Industrial area.

Obviously, safety

Is

not a new field of research.

Many theories

and programs have been developed to explain and modify accidents.

A

historical review of such concepts and efforts will be presented first to

highlight the relative Importance of safety through the years.

this

In

review a major emphasis will be placed on industrial programs since
Is

It

not only the area of Interest here but also where safety has developed

the most.

Then behavior modification procedures will be presented as an

alternative for the solution of safety problems.

The use of such proce-

dures for dealing with other Industry-related Issues will be offered as

testimony to its effectiveness
The goal of this project

In
Is

a

this area.
to underline the Importance of safety

and to present a specific procedure^ feedback and suggestions on hazardous

conditions, to modify safety related situations

In

an

Industrial

setting,

and experimentally measure Its effectiveness.

Safety

Historical Development

Safety or protection of human lives from death and Injury
old as human beings themselves (Stack & Elbow,

1957).

Is as

Survival was none

other than the anticipation of dangers to meet them skillfully.

However,

3

early progress

In

safeguarding human life was delayed by the conviction

that accidents were Inevitable and predestined.

Accidents were seen

for too long as an Inherent and integral part of
life, as an unmodiflable

condition of an uncontrolled environment.

This deterministic and fatal-

istic view began to change with an increase In the control
of the environ-

ment through knowledge.

Laws were used to explain events and thus per-

mitted to anticipate them realistically.

Nevertheless, the efforts to

prevent certain happenings, specifically accidents, were Initially
Individual efforts only.

It

was not until the "machine age" that an

organized effort to prevent accidents began to develop (Heinrich,

1941).

This explains perhaps the larger development of "Industrial safety" as
compared to other areas of safety.
With the mechanization of industry, which started

during the eighteenth
the work processes.

in

England

century, revolutionary changes were Introduced

in

Due to the concomitant disruption of the feudal

relations of production

in

the countryside and the increasing demand for

labor In the towns’ new factories, a large number of people moved from
rural

to urban areas to work under increasingly crowded and hazardous

conditions.

As the introduction of machinery advanced throughout and

after the Industrial Revolution, work control was progressively taken
away from the workers; the machine now controlled their work.

conditions account for the large increase

in

These

accident rates which gradu-

ally awakened public consciousness to the need for accident control.

This increase

in

consciousness, however, did not lead to major prevention

programs or improvement

in

working conditions for many years.

Since

4

labor was plentiful, employers saw
no reason to change and workers
had

no laws to protect them (Stack 4
Elbow,

concern and
them.

If

1957).

Production was the main

workers had an accident there were others
ready to replace

Employers frequently believed they owed no
obligation to the

worker.

When they did acknowledge responsibility,
they "paid their

debt" by giving the worker
of the family.

Job as Janitor or employing another member

a

Deaths were frequent and accepted as the normal
price of

progress (Blake,

1943).

Since Jobs were so scarce they were taken even

though the risks Involved were pretty high.

Gradually several

laws were passed

countries to protect the worker.

ment factory Inspections.

In

for mill gears and shafts.
trial

In

1833 the British established govern-

Instituted factory Inspections
In

the placement of guards around machines.

and Austria (Heinrich,
laws was still

law to provide fencing

Meanwhile Massachusetts, the leading Indus-

the first bureau of Labor statistics

In

the different Industrial

1844 they enacted a

state In the United States,

duced ten years later

In

1869, and

1877 a

In

Compensation laws were IntroEngland

However, the financial burden of these

a

safe environment (Bird & Germain,

Not until the state laws Increased the cost of occupational

1966).

Injuries to a

which affected the employers were they forced to find methods to

reduce Injuries.

In

fact, workers' compensation laws made accidents so

expensive they did more to promote Interest
factor (Blake,
In

In

not strong enough to serve as an Incentive to modify

working conditions and maintain

level

1867,

law requiring

Massachusetts and twenty years later

1941).

In

1911,

1943).

In

safety than any other

The first state to pass such

and the others followed thereafter.

a

law was New Jersey

Later on.

Insurance rate

5

levels were to play an Important
role in promoting safety:

Their depen-

dence upon number of Injuries made
prevention efforts very Important to
reduce costs.
It

life which

Is

Interesting to see that it was not the concern
for human

led to the

development of a safe environment

in

the workplace.

Nor was the establishment of legal controls an
incentive to ameliorate

working conditions.

Only when profits were directly affected by workers'

accidents did the employers modify the working environment
and only then
did safety become a major concern.

It

was not until the first decade of

the twentieth century that management undertook the task of
preventing

accidents

relatively consistent way as profitability and safety

in a

became more closely related ("Accident Prevention Manual," 1968).

The crucial

importance of the role of the worker

ment of safety however, should not be underestimated.

in

the develop-

It was

the

workers who suffered directly the consequences of the unsafe conditions
and

it was

their protests with the increase

In

accident rates that

awakened the public awareness which led to the development of the compensation laws.
efforts, who

It
in

was the workers, as the pioneers of organized safety
1912 formed the National Council

for Industrial Safety.

A year later that organization was to become the National Safety Council,

an active and well

respected organization today.

The National Safety Council

.

Initially this organization's prime

focus was to study the prevention of industrial accidents.

Later on It

was to include all accidents In general as its concern, regardless of

place and activity (Blake,

1943);

but its specific efforts have been

6

concentrated mainly on Industry.

The organization's objective has
been

defined as "the elimination of accidents
(...) [since] accidents produce

economic and social

loss.

Impair individual and group productivity,

cause inefficiency and retard the advancement
of standards of living"
C'Accident Prevention Manual," 1968,

p.

8).

One of the most important contributions of
the National Safety
Council

has been the elaboration and update of
accident records from 1913

onward and the definition and clarification of
accidents, its causes and
remedies.

Their records show the importance of prevention by
allowing

comparisons of the present accident rates with those existent
by showing the differential

of industry.

1913, and

in

improvements according to the type and size

For example, steel, automobile, cement and public utilities

have a much lower accident rate than mining companies, and large firms

report fewer per capita accidents than small businesses (Blake,
It

1943).

was also the National Safety Council which developed "the three E’s

for safety":

engineering, education and enforcement.

Their efforts were

concentrated on engineering safe machines, on training and educating the
employees, and on involving employers

In

the enforcement of both.

They

developed assistant programs for industry and set safety standards for
every type of industry.

In

fact the industrial firms that are associated

with the National Safety Council do report
and

a

lower percentage of accidents

injuries than those which are not associated ("Accident Facts," 1977).

However, the National Safety Council does not have the legal power to

enforce its policies and guidelines.
(Occupational

Safety and Health Act.

This role has been assumed by the

7

O ccupational Safety and Health
Act (OSHA)
by Congress In 1970.
in

It

.

This act was passed

was to be enforced by the Department
of Labor,

response to the concern about the lack
of uniform and comprehensive

provisions for the protection against
workplace safety and health
hazards (”AII About OSHA,” 1976).

It

was brought to congressional atten-

tion that 80 million Americans spend
their days on the job; that Job-

related accidents have accounted for more
than 14,000 deaths; that two
and a half million workers were disabled;
and occupational diseases totaled 300,000 by

1970.

As a consequence Congress passed this law with
the

main Intent of assuring ”so far as possible every
working man and woman
In

the Nation safe and healthful working conditions to
preserve our

human resources" ("All About OSHA," 1976,

p.

I).

OSHA^s Intent has been translated Into practice

In

various ways:

Through regular Inspections, the establishment of reporting and recordkeeping procedures to monitor job- related Injuries and Illnesses, the

definition of employer and employee rights and responsibilities, the

development of mandatory job safety and health hazards and many other
ways of encouraging employers and employees to reduce hazards and Improve
safety In the workplace.

OSHA has also established safety standards for all types of
Industries and has developed clear safety principles and practices which

permit one to Identify and classify hazards and potential sources of
harm ("Principles and Practices," 1976).

The National

Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH)

who performs research and

Is

Institute for

develops occupational environmental standards applicable to the problems

8

of occupational

safety and health.

mental and medical

ment, etc.

Its recommendations cover environ-

standards as well as work practices, protective
equip-

Periodic reviews of these standards are also NIOSH's
res-

ponsibility (NIOSH,

1975,

1977,

1978).

In

fact,

some of these safety

standards and requirements have had to be modified

in

certain cases due

to the industry’s reaction, to what they termed "insensitivity,
harass-

ment and nitpicking" ("Out go silly," 1978).

Facts and Figures

If

one were to consider the number of accidents per year without

considering Its relation to the increase

in

population, that is, absolute

number of accidents per year, the conclusion would be that all the efforts

mentioned previously to enhance safety have been useless.
is

That

is

why it

Important to compare the accident data with the earliest reasonably

acceptable estimate,

1912,

keeping as a "measure unit" the number of

accidents and disabling injuries over

a

fixed number of workers.

An accident as defined by the National

Prevention Manual," 1968,

p.

30)

Is "an

Safety Council

("Accident

event or rapidly occurring series

of events arising out of an unsafe act or an unsafe condition and culmin-

ating in an unpremeditated injury, death or property damage."
injury (Heinrich,

1941)

is

ing their jobs for a full

Rate (A.F.R.)
p.

Is

any injury that prevents workers from performday after the accident.

The Accident Frequency

determined by using the following definition (Keefer,

30):

number of disabling injuries x 1.000.000
A.F.R.

A disabling

total

number of person-hours worked

1943,

9

According to the National Safety Council, accident
rates per
100,000 population were reduced

tion in the overall

1,850,000 fewer accidental deaths than

in

rate had not been reduced.

workers lives were lost

in

In

if

the

industry an estimated 18,000 to 21,000

1912.

In

1976,

in a

work force more than

size and producing more than seven times as much, there were

in

12,500 work deaths.

This implies a reduction of

100,000 in work death rates.

In

7155,

from

21

to 6 per

1943 Keefer reported a total of

deaths for 1933 and a reduction of 67^ from 1926 to 1941.
1941

This reduc-

rate, during a period when the population more than

doubied, has resulted

double

between 1912 and 1976.

14,500

The figures for

were 19,200 work deaths and 10,600 permanent disabilities.
For 1968 the Figures reported by the National Safety Council were

as follows:

114,000 deaths, half of which occurred

in

the industrial

setting, and 10.8 million injuries of which 2.2 million occurred at the

workplace.

The total cost of these accidents was $22 billion, with $7.4

attributed to industrial accidents.
times lower than

if

This cost, howeyer,

is

two to three

the 1912 rate had sustained itself.

With respect to the size of the industrial organization there are
some interesting figures.

As shown on Table

I,

the small enterprises

According to the

seem to have more accidents than the larger ones.

National Safety Council this is due to the lack of specialized safety

personnel, budget tightness and the amount and variety of problems that
a

manager of

probably

a

a small

smal

I

This also means that

business would benefit much more from an intervention

than a large firm.
less time.

business has to confront.

Results sbould also manifest

a

greater improvement

in

10

Table
Size of

Number of workers
emp oyed

I

Industry and

% of total

Injury Rate

industrial

employment

1

% of total

500 or more

86

69

100 - 500

12

27

2

4

100 or

less

Finally it

is

Injuries

important to compare the rate of industrial accidents

against current overall accident rates, since such accidents no longer

account for half the deaths as
a

percentage of injuries.

in

1968,

nor do they account for as large

As can be seen on Table 2, work deaths consti-

tute today only 16.5^ of the total number of accidents, and industrial
disabling injuries 22 %.
has been said

However, the figures are still very high and it

("Accident Facts," 1977) that while one makes

safety speech, two persons will be killed, 200 will suffer
injury, and the cost of these accidents will

a

a

10-minute

disabling

be one million dollars.

On

the average, eleven accidental deaths and 1,200 disabling injuries occur

every hour.

Half of these happen

in

motor vehicle accidents and more than

one third occur at home.
As mentioned previously, the preceding facts have had a differential

impact on the development of safety and apparently the cost of

accidents has been the strongest influence
programs.

In

in

the development of safety

any case, a profusion of theories and models have been

developed to promote safety as

«m

be seen

In

the following section.

Theories and Models about Accident Causatl
on
According to the National Safety Council

Manual," 1968) the function of safety

Is

("Accident Prevention

to assist line management

In

achieving maximum production by limiting the number of
disabling accidents
and injuries which occur as a result of some unit in the
industrial pro-

cess failing:
behavior.

equipment, materials, methods, safety devices or Individual

Two main ideas can be extracted from this position.

First,

that safety efforts' main objective, as set by the National Safety Council,
is

production, and second, that accidents can be due to

factors ranging from environmental to behavioral.

a

series of

The National Safety

Council does not believe one factor excludes another, but rather that

accidents are the consequence of

machine system.
today,

is not

a

combination of factors

in

the man-

This view of accident causation, though shared by many

universally accepted,

a

point to be elaborated on below.

As previously was mentioned, accidents did not become a management

concern until relatively recently.
sidered to be at fault.

Rather, workers themselves were con-

This situation explains, perhaps, the develop-

ment of what can be classified as personality factor theories

,

which

consider human error as the main cause of industrial accidents (Heinrich,
1941;

Hersey,

1936;

Kerr,

1957; McMurray,

1930).

With the enforcement of

laws to protect the worker from the machines, however, the emphasis of

safety literature shifted towards the environment (Dalziel,
1969;

Jones,

1971;

Paterson,

1969).

1969; Greene,

And finally the synthesis has been

achieved by the systems theories which as mentioned previously, conceptual-

12

Table 2
Accidents by Class and Cost for 1976

Class

A.

Deaths

Tota

42,500
4.000^
200°

I

.700,000
100 000 ^
°
10 000
.

.

46.700

I

.810.000

1

24.7 bi

I

ion

I

Work
Non-motor
vehicle
Motor vehicle

2 . 100.000

8.500
4.000°

100.000°

2.200.000

17.8 bi

24.000

3.710.000

6.3 bi

.500

2.700.000

5

104.700

10.420.000

12.500

Total

C

Cost^

Motor Vehicle
Public non-work
Work
Home

B.

Injuries

I

ion

1

Home
Non -motor

vehicle
Motor vehicle
Tota

D.

3.700.000

23.800
200

I

10.000
I

I

ion

Public^
Tota

21

1

GROSS TOTAL

Corrections for overlapping categories
NET TOTAL

-

4.200
100.500

I

billion

53.8 billion

10.000

10.310.000

53.8^biIIIon

insurance administrative cost, pro^Includes wage loss, medical expenses
i.e., time lost by non-injured
perty damage, fire loss and indirect oss,

13

Table 2 continued
workers.

This number appears
Tne Net

I

ota

I

.

two different categories, but accounts
for the
overlappings have been corrected in calculating

in

^

^Excludes motor vehicles and work accidents in
public places.
Includes
recreation, transportation except motor vehicle,
public building accidents.
The cost data were not available discriminated per
categories. The
total therefore, flight be inflated because of
overlappings, but this error
should not exceed 4^.

14

Ized accident causation factors as a
continuum;
is

mainly at fault,

in

others there

is a

In

some cases the person

clear interaction between the

person and the environment, and in still
others the environmental condi-

tions account for most of the causes of an accident.

A more detailed

review of all these theoretical perspectives follows.

Personality factor theories

For many years accidents were believed to be caused by the
"acci-

dent prone" worker since accident reports mentioned that

employees had more than 50 % of the accidents (McMurray,
Aaron, Boh & Bales,

1964).

14

1930;

industrial

Strasser,

groups of 50 to 750 women working

British munition factory during World War

had most of the accidents.

0 % of

Greenwood and Woods (1919) for example, after

collecting accident frequency on
a

\

I,

in

found very few workers

This led them to say some workers have inher-

ent characteristics that account for their having more accidents than
others.

Newbold (1926) followed up on these findings and observed that

the average number of accidents
small

number of workers.

is

Influenced to a large extent by a

Later on Farmer and Chambers (1939)

introduced

the term "accident prone" based on their own work using psychological

tests with London bus drivers.

They believed accident proneness was an

immutable characteristic.

The concept of accident proneness was wel
I940’s and

I950’s (Barry, Crisera &

was defined as

a

'Fidel

1

,

1

accepted during the

I

975)

.

Accident proneness

personality trait, "a constitutional tendency within the

organism to engage

in

unsafe behavior" (Kerr,

developed to identify such

a

1957,

p.

3).

Tests were

trait and the personality characteristics of
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accident repeaters

In

the search to control the number of
Industrial

accidents (Hale & Hale,

1970).

Harris,

(1949)

for example, developed a

paper and pencil test for this purpose and
administered

to a group of

It

25 accident repeaters and to a control group
of accident-free workers.

He found no significant difference In the
questionnaire results of the

two groups and concluded that the hypothesis of

a

personality factor

accounting for high number of accidents was untenable.

Crawford (I960)

analyzed the characteristics of 735 electric utility workers who
had had
220 personal

Injury accidents.

He was unable to Identify accident prone

Individuals by the traditional statistical analysis.

Other tests designed

to measure accident proneness had very low reliability scores, thereby

Invalidating any conclusions about their results (Hale

&

Hale,

This failed to support the notion of accident proneness as
al

factor.

a

1970).

constitution-

However, the tendency to attribute the cause of accidents to

worker’s Individual characteristics remained popular.
Several

psychological

factors such as Intelligence, personality,

and attitudes have been assessed to try to establish a relationship be-

tween Individual characteristics and accidents.
IQ

al,

tests has not been found to be related to number of accidents (Barry et
1975).

Lack of knowledge or skill has been used to explain accident

frequency rate.
of

Intelligence as measured by

For Heinrich (1931) human failure was the principal cause

Industrial accidents.

He attributed 85^ of accidents to lack of

workers’ knowledge of how to work safely.

According to Heinrich, given the

choice between safe, capable and experienced men to work
tions, or unsafe.

Incapable and Inexperienced men to work

In

In

ment, a safety officer should choose the first alternative.

unsafe condia

safe environ-
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Research on personality and emotional
factors
Smith,

mixed (Kerr,

Is

1957;

1970). Smiley C1955), for example,
emphasized the Importance of

emotional disturbance In accident
causation.

In

his study he found 12 %

of accident Involved workers had
some type of emotional disturbance,

versus only 8$ of control group.

Other authors report similar findings

when comparing test results of accident
repeaters versus results of

accident-free workers (Tiffen

&

McCormick,

1962;

Whitlock

Low physical and emotional vigor caused
by Individual

work-related worries, home difficulties, fatigue,

&

Crannell,

1949).

problems such as

lack of sleep, and

periodic emotional disturbances were adduced by Mersey
(1936) as the
principal explanation for accidents.

Sterner (1969) found motivational

factors responsible for high accident frequency rate.

order to decrease the number of accidents
people’s motives to behave carelessly.

He argued that In

It was crucial

to change

On the other hand, Tydiaska (1952)

found no significant difference between high and low accident groups on

personality tests administered prior to employment.
With respect to attitudes several studies have found significant

correlations between high accident experience and negative attitudes
towards employment (Davids & Mahoney,
de Wllmar,

1967).

"Interpretation

is

However Barry et

a

1975;

I

confused by some methodological

sum, although no experimental

1968;

In

limitations that have

accident causation"

(p.

3-6).

data has confirmed the effect of

workers’ personality traits on accident rate.

It

Is

still

a

popular belief

today that accidents are caused by some constitutional factor.
Insecurity,

Mertens

(1975) point out that their

plagued the work on personality variables
In

Harper & Kalton,

Hostility,

Instability, resentment of authority, and other characteristics
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are still believed to be the
explenatlon for accidents.

However, "none
of these Cf actors] have been
Isolated to show them related to
the Inci-

dence of accidents, nor could
corrective measures based on them
become
practical in application" ("Safety
and the Bottom," 1977, p. 2).
Environmental versus individual models

In

search of more practical accident preventive
measures, and

in

response to legal demands to protect the
workers, attention has increasingly been drawn towards the environment,
towards the situation

the accident occurred instead of to the
individual
(1969) put it, "safety by emotional appeal

is

involved.

in

which

As Paterson

no substitute for the con-

scientious application of methods by which effective
analysis, specific
remedies and identifiable improvements become

a

reality" (p.

Ade-

18).

quate design of equipment to guarantee effective ways of
working

a

machine

was seen as the primary factor for instituting safety motivational
pro-

grams CNertney,

1975).

Guards for machinery as

a

protective measure

became one critical answer to safety concerns (Greene,

1969; Jones,

Initially guards were resisted both by management and by workers.
was probably the result of poor design.

obstruct work, making
clude a

j’ob.

it

In

1971).

This

many cases guards tended to

longer and consequently more expensive, to con-

However standard guards were developed for most machines

and today, are part of the machine itself.

Another protective measure was the installation of two push-start
buttons

in

those machines which, while

in

operation, could by accident

catch the workers’ hands ("Accident Prevention Manual," 1968).

Specific
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procedures and detailed rules on how to
de-schock electricity (Dalzlel,
1969) and how to control

high pressure systems (Paterson,

developed and became the main part of safety
programs.

1969) were

In

summary, good

working instructions and safe and properly
operating equipment were supposed to maintain low accident rates.

First-aid programs can be placed within the preventive
model of

protective environmental changes.
the best first aid

is

Clark (1971) stressed the fact that

the prevention of injury instead of its treatment.

This, he said, required the development of awareness
among the workers

about the potential hazards

in

the work area and the maintenance of

trained personnel to deal with unexpected accidents,
first-aid guidelines on how to deal with accidental

Mort (1969) gave
Ingestion of chemi-

cals and what type of equipment to have available for such

a

purpose.

Rettew (1971) recommended the installation of emergency showers and eye
wash facilities mainly

in

chemical

plants, and developed

questionnaire to Identify eye hazards

in an

industrial

a

sel f— appra sa
i

setting.

Many other authors have developed more specific first-aid programs
according to the type of setting,

in

response both to accident prevention

and to deal with Injuries once they occur.

An

integrative outlook:

During the past

the man-machine system

10

to 20 years the trend of accident causation

theories has been towards an Integration of both individual and environmental

factors.

As far back as I960,

Laner and Sell

said human

industrial

accidents had three main causes ranging from a low to high proportion of
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human influence:

plant or material failure

(a)

for example, a gas escape;

in

the vicinity of people,

contact between machinery and worker,
such

(b)

as putting a hand inside a presser;
and (c) momentary creation of an

unsafe situation such as tool obstructions,
oil spills, etc.

these authors still attribute

a

Although

large percentage of fault to the worker,

they do acknowledge the existence of material
or environmental hazards.

The National Safety Council clearly states
that the prevention of

accidents and injuries

achieved through control of working environment

is

an^ people’s actions ("Accident Prevention Manual,"
1968).

It

places

great importance on ergonomics as the "scientific
approach" to develop
safer man-machine system.

a

By designing and constructing safe machinery,

people will work more efficiently and will be less likely to
make errors
resulting

machine

is

in

accidents.

The interaction between the worker and the

thus clearly acknowledged.

As accidents have gradually come to be seen as multicaused systems

approaches to accident prevention have been proposed (Pope,
1970;

Smith 1970).

accident causation

Hale and Hale (1970) developed
in

a

1969;

Sasser,

theoretical model of

which they defined an accident as "the failure of

person to cope with a true situation presented to him/her.
the failure may lie largely with the person,

or more usually with both"

(p.

118).

a

The cause of

largely with the situation,

Wigglesworth (1972) postulated an

injury causation model which says that the conditions necessary for injury

to occur are hazard and error.

response"

(p.

Error

is "a

73) and hazard "a potential

may be classified

in

missing or inappropriate

source of bodily damage. .[wh ichU
.

terms of the type of energy they deliver or... the
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energy exchange which they interrupt"

(p.

are seen as part of

in

a

chain of events

73),

Both errors and hazards

the man-machine system and not

as a blameworthy act of any one
person or situation,

Blumenthal
in

(1970) defined accidents as symptomatic
of malfunctions

the man-technological

system.

He then explained the malfunctions

within an organizational structure model and
defined the different safety

problems according to each organizational

Hammer CI972) also acknowledged

causation theory of accidents.

a

combination of factors

According to this author,

damage could result from four causes:

adverse characteristics of

a

level.
in

his

injury and

material failure, human error,

product and unusual environmental conditions.

He emphasized the importance of a systems outlook of safety
as the only

way to protect the individual.

Barry (1975) strongly contested the individual outlook of prevention.

"When we direct our questions to individuals, we ask the wrong

questions" (p. 53) she said.

She believed this human causative outlook

led to the search for human error explanations and usually to training

efforts which did not affect injury rates significantly.

Barry considered

that the only effective prevention model was the community-oriented model
which integrated all accident factors.

Although this integrative outlook of safety has meant
forward

the understanding of accidents and injuries,

in

generally led to more active intervention programs.
safety literature of the past ten years
implement

a

safety program (Firenze,

is

a

it has

step

not

The majority of the

either concerned with how to

1969; Goode,

|975);

how to develop

a
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safety department within an
organization (Evans,

1969;

Strasser et al.,

1964); or how to develop a safety
training program (Pflster,

1975;

Price,

1976).

gram.

Eicher (1977) for example, described RSO
or Reported Significant

Yet few studies report the actual
use of a specific pro-

Observation as an information-gathering
technique which uses employee
participants to describe situations which they
have witnessed.

Employees

Identify good and bad practices and safe
and unsafe conditions.

permits the Identification of hazards and their
elimination.

This

McLean

(1977) suggested the use of videotape equipment
by management and the

services of

a

safety engineer training specialist as an ideal way
to study

safer ways to do
Job safely.

a

job, investigate accidents and train people how
to do a

Petersen (1975) emphasized the need to integrate the princi-

ples of human learning, the effective approaches to industrial
training,
and the development of adequate attitudes towards learning,

Implement

a

safety training program.

in

order to

Price (1976) stressed the importance

of close cooperation between safety and training professionals in order

to correct deficiencies in safety training programs.

Both the National Safety Council

(’'Accident Prevention Manual,”

1968) and OSHA (’’Principles and Practices,"

1976) give very detailed and

specific guidelines for the organization of

a

ment of

a

safety program, the develop-

safety committee and the implementation of Its activities.

The National Safety Council stresses the fact that supervisors are the
key persons in any safety program because they are

the workers.

It

in

direct contact with

also emphasizes the importance of the interdependency

between safety and efficiency, and production to guarantee the effectiveness of any safety related Intervention,

The need not only to implement
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safety programs but measure their
effectiveness foiiowing the guideiines
summarized above seems appropriate at
this point.
Empirical validation of safety programs:

firgt attempts

As mentioned earlier, the major emphasis
of the safety literature

has been concentrated on recommendations
for safety programs, rather than
on the actual

tiveness.

Implementation of such programs or measure of their
effec-

However the need to find specific ways to measure
safety

efforts has long been recognized (Jacobs,

1970; Tarrantz,

1970).

Grimaldi

Cj970) for example, recommended a specific
method to measure safety per-

formance that remains to be tested.

He did report, though, a study In

which he examined by factor analysis the relationship between
nine manage-

ment variables such as cost accounting and five safety variables,
which
Included standard frequency and severity of accident rates, for
nesses.

He found that

In

are good safety programs.

firms where there

Is
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busi-

good cost control, there

He also reported that low building and equip-

ment maintenance costs correlated with high safety standards.

Rockwell

and Bhise (1970) proposed two experimental approaches to measure safety

performance and developed them fully
their method was still not

a

theory.

They recognized that

de facto safety performance measurement

technique but could very well
model

In

lead to one.

The main advantage of their

was the continuous assessment of safety performance without waiting

for accidents to occur.

Although the recognition of the need to measure safety programs'

effectiveness

is

a

step ahead,

It

has not led to many specific studies.
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Most of the research reported
has concentrated on finding
correlations
between age and/or experience
and number of accidents CVan
Zelst. 1970)
or relationships between safety
program practices and other work
factors
in companies with high
versus low accident rates using
questionnaire

techniques CCohen,

Smith & Cohen, H.

A;

of research definitely has value,

cretely evaluating

a

it

,

1975),

Even though this type

does not fulfill the need of con-

specific safety program or technique.

however, a few such studies.

A brief review of empirical

There are,
research

in

this field, other than behavior
modification programs follows.
An early attempt to actually measure
the effectiveness of safety

devices was Bel bin’s

Cl

whether the content of

956) experiment with posters.
a

Bel bin questioned

given poster Influenced recall and/or individual’s

behavior and whether that influence was affected
by individual differences such as age and experience.

She showed six road safety propaganda

posters to the experimental group for three minutes and
afterwards asked
them to identify photographs
present.

in

which the hazardous conditions were

Only six of 24 photos were related to the posters.

The control

group was asked to interpret the same set of photographs as the
experimental group, but without having seen the posters previously.

cant difference

in

recall

was found according to type of poster presented,

but there was a significant difference between the two groups
ing hazardous conditions.

No signifi-

That

is,

in

identify-

the experimental subjects did not

remember what the posters said, but they could identify hazardous conditions that were mentioned
was found

in

in

the initial

posters.

No significant change

recall after one day, nor after two weeks.

A significant
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difference

in recall

was found between drivers
and non-drivers.

Drivers

identified hazards more often
than non-drivers.

These findings led
Belbin to conclude that
propaganda posters were effective
if the subjects
had previously learned the
necessary behaviors to drive safely,
but

were not useful by themselves.
Laner and Sell
industrial

CI960) measured the effectiveness
of posters In an

setting by counting the number
of accidents which were refer-

red to in the poster. Their
main concern was to determine how
posters can
be made effective.
Thus posters were dispiayed in large
sizes, at

strategic places, and following the
guidelines of advertising experts.
Three groups of subjects were used:
In

one, three types of posters were

placed simultaneously throughout the
experimental phase.

In

another,

the three types of posters were put up
consecutively every two weeks, and
in

the control group no posters were used.

there was a differential

influence

in

The results demonstrated that

accident rate between experimental

and control group and that posters were more
effective
Jobs.

four of the six

The authors concluded that posters can be made
effective and do

alter accident rate.
still

in

remains

a

The extent to which they do alter behavior, however,

difficult question to answer due to the many uncontrolled

yariables involved.
Although posters can become effective, they are by no means the
panacea of safety.

As Strasser et al.

C1964) point out,

posters and pep

talks are not the answer to safety problems, and only the use of techni-

ques established

in

actual operation are effective.

But which are those

techniques and how can one measure their effectiveness?

Ellis (1975) did
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a review of the efforts
to prorate occupetional

research

in

five major areas:

ment safety standards;

(b)

(a)

safety.

He divided the

the setting and enforcing
of govern-

employee safety training;

(c)

statistical

feedback given to companies on
accident rates; (d) management
sponsored
safety programs; and te) use
of economic incentives.
Although Ellis
found that most of the studies
were poorly controlled from a
methodological

standpoint, he did report that the
research findings consistently
indicated a significant beneficial
effect of the management sponsored

programs.

This conclusion confirms Firenze's

Strasser et al’s

(

(

1969 ). Goode's

(

1975 ) and

1964 ) principles of safety program
development.

It

Is

also consistent with the management
theories which emphasize worker participation and management support as the
basic elements for the success of

any organizational program (Drucker,

1965

;

McGregor,

1968 ; Miles,

1975 ).

Behavior Modification as an Alternative Approach to
Safety
Prom the review of the literature presented previously,

it

appears

that additional evaluative studies of safety
programs need to be done.
What a safety behavior

is,

how hazards are depicted and how

committee should be instituted seems clear.

a

safety

But how safety behaviors can

be measured and modified, what procedures should
be used to reduce hazards

and how to measure the effectiveness and outcomes of a safety
committee

are all areas that definitely need further investigation.

There

is a

need for self -evaluative methodologies, of experimentally demonstrated

effectiveness, to permit safety related behaviors and unsafe conditions
to be modified.

Considering the definition of behavior modification or
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applied behavior analysis as "a systematic,
performance based, self-

evaluative method of changing behavior"
(Su zer-Azarof f and Mayer, 1977,
I

p.

6)

and its frequently reported effectiveness,

Cas will

be illustrated

this method seems to be a viable and
recommended alternative for

below-)

dealing with safety problems.

Behavior modification techniques have been used
increasingly

various settings, with
Kazdin,

1975).

a

high degree of success (Brown & Presbie,

Behavior programs have been implemented

clinics CAyllon

&

Azrin,

1968; Clark,

gutistic and retarded children (Fox

Azrin,

&

1976;

schools and

in

Evans & Hamerlynck,

in

1972), to help

Neisworth & Smith,

1973;

1973), to modify children’s classroom behavior, or to change
their

behavior

the home (Becker,

in

Azaroff & Mayer,

1971;

Walker,

1977;

Bushel

I,

Daniels,

1973;

1974; Zifferblatt,

1973).

1974;

Sulzer-

Behavioral tech-

niques have also been used successfully to develop self-control
behaviors
both in children and adults (Foster,
&

Mahoney,

1974; Tharp & Wetzel,

1974) and to teach many other behaviors which

1972; Thoresen

individuals need

to deal adequately with their environment (Barlow, Leitenberg & Agras,
1969;

Krasner,

McCann,

1971;

Lazarus & Davison,

1975; Ulmann & Krasner,
In

1971;

Lieberman, King, DeRisi

&

1965).

the industrial and business fields the application of behavior

modification procedures
research and practice

is

is

fairly recent.

in

Kreitner,

1975).

a

whole new field of

evolving as behavior modification

changing people’s behavior

be useful

However,

in

is

found to

the work place (Luthans

A brief overview of this research follows.

&
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Behavior mo dification

in

industry

Behavior modification has been
used successfully for
management
purposes in various settings.
Behavior modification programs
have been
found to operate effectively
in the government area
(Everett, Hayward and
Meyers, 1974; M, ler 4 Hi ler,
1970; Pomerieau, ,975); In the
manag^ent
of hospital settings
(Quilitch, 1975) and in the service
areas (Kohlenberg, Phillips 5 Procter,
1976; Winett 4 NIetzel, 1975).
For the purpose
of illustrating the use of
behavior modification in the
Industrial setting
toweven, only research carried out
specifically In the area of Industry
and business will be discussed in
detail.
,

,

Perhaps positive reinforcement has
been the most frequently used
procedure to modify behavior in the work
place.
Herman, deMontes, Dominguez, Montes & Hopkins (1973)
increased the punctuality of six chronically
late workers by having their supervisor
deliver a daily money bonus for

arriving on time.

The contingent payment for punctuality
significantly

reduced the rate of tardiness of the treatment
group as compared with the
control group.

Nord

and tardiness.

Each month of perfect attendance made workers
eligible to

enter

a

(1970) used a

lottery system to reduce absenteeism

lottery for one prize per 25 employees, and 6
months perfect

attendance made them eligible for
the winners were published

in

a

color television set.

the company newspaper,

The names of

Sick leave payments

were reduced by 65^ and absenteeism and tardiness decreased
to 1/4 of prior
level

during the first year of the program.

Pedalino and Gamboa (1974) also decreased absenteeism
of 215 employees.

In a

sample

Using a lottery incentive sysfem, absenteeism rate was
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reduced significantly during the treatment
phase as compared to a
reversal

period.

Orpen (1978) also reported the successful
use of

bonuses given for attendance on the
absenteeism rate of industrial
workers.

Lama

I

and Bonfield (1978) reported comparative
success using

self-monitoring procedures to reduce job tardiness
and increase percentage of time spent working.

Positive reinforcement has also proven to be effective
work related errors.

in

reducing

By using both positive reinforcement and
feedback,

Rettig (1975) managed to decrease the number of
errors on accounts pay-

able vouchers of accounting employees of an
operator of retail restaurants.
The combination of positive reinforcement and feedback
was also effec-

tive

in

improving driver productivity

(Mitchell,

1976).

in

an Australian organization

A weekly feedback system using a delivery

record was established to show drivers their progress

problem areas.

in

information

the different

Any improvement received recognition by way of

congratulations and appreciation from top management.

a

note of

Twenty months after

first changes were introduced, there was significant Improvement across
the range of factors observed.

A

major increase

reported ("ACDC reaches new," 1975) by
ment.

a

I

productivity was also

manufacturer of electronic equip-

Once baseline level was established, workers were shown how to

measure their own performance and submit daily and weekly reports.

Among

the consequences which proved to be most effective were daily data

reports comparing current with previous performance, beating

a

past record,

and receiving favorable comments and notes of recognition from the company

pres dent.
i
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Gup+on and Lebcw t,97,,
used Pne.ack's principle
to increase the
number of new service
contract calls and sales of
two telephone sollciBy reinforcing the

low rate behavior,

service calls, with a high

rate behavior, renewal
calls, they managed to increase
the first consider^bly.

Positive reinforcement, administered
by direct line superivsor,
’
was used effectively by
Luthans and Kreitner (1975) to
improve group

quality control

the production line of a
medium-sized industrial

in

plant.

The rate of daily defective
parts decreased from an average
of
per day to two during experimental
period.
Finally, the reinforcement

procedure has been successfully
applied to train supervisors (Goldstein
Sorcher, 1974; Luthans S Kreitner,
1975); to teach interviewing and
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&

application skills (Barbee 5 Keil,l973)
and to develop Job finding skills
and procedures CAzrin, Flores
4
Kaplan,

1975;

Jones

8,

Azrin,

1973).

Other behavioral procedures besides
reinforcement have been successfully applied to deal with business-related
problems.
lin and Gray

For example, Marho-

(1976) reduced the cash shortages of six
restaurant cashiers

by using group response cost accompanied
by verbal and written instruc-

tions.

Each cashier would

daily loss

if

such

lose from his or her salary the average of

loss exceeded

creased to the goal

level

\% of total

sales.

Cash shortages de-

during experimental phase and increased during

the reversal period.
Some of the aforementioned reports may lack the strict
methodology
to Justify the conclusion that the results obtained were due
only to the

behavioral y-based interventions.
I

Yet they certainly clearly indicate

30

the potential for apply! ng
principles previously tested
in rigorously
controlled experimental conditions.
The most interesting finding
common
to a large number of the
reported experiences was that
feedback or
infomatior, about work performance,
regardless of social interaction
between workers and managers,
is a particularly
effective reinforcer
CSantamaria, 1977).
program developed at Emery Air
Freight ("At Emery Air," 1973),
providing workers with information
on the outcome of their behavior
in
fn a

achievement and performance terms,
was enough to maintain high
levels of
performance.
Feedback was such an effective relnforcer
that when interrupted, for management reasons,
performance decreased more than

50/5

the shipping operations and rose again
when reintroduced (Feeney,

Feedback was also effective

i

n

ma nta
i

i

n

i

in a

aircrafts ("Errors get Whammy," 1976).
errors employees made

In

1975), and

a

in

parts department of small

After measuring the number of

inventory cards and realizing that the employees

were not aware of these errors because they were
corrected by
group of employees,

1972).

ng accuracy of performance in a

group of accounting employees as mentioned
above (Rettig,
reducing errors of six hourly workers

in

list of daily errors was established.

a

different

This list

was given to the initial group of employees with written
instructions on
how to correct them.

In

less than one week the number of errors de-

creased from a daily average of 34 to
by approximately

2;

department productivity Increased

50/5.

The introduction of an informational feedback system reduced the

truck turnaround time

in a

textile company from

a

baseline average of 67
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minutes to 38.2 minutes (Runnion,
Johnson & McWhorter,
feedback conditions were used:

(a)

1978).

Three

weekly letter with turnaround
times

and goals met and suggestions for
meeting new goals;

(b)

feedback letter

sent to plant manager every two
weeks; and (c) four week variable feedback.

Individual

re inforcers were

introduced also such as congratula-

tory memos from the plant manager and
company president; plaques to

warehousemen, etc.

According to the authors, feedback not only
improved

and maintained cooperative behaviors, but
increased efficiency and

reduced costs.
Emmert (1978) measured the impact of group
performance feedback

versus individual performance feedback

in an

industrial

setting.

He found

that both types of feedback increased performance
of the hourly workers
who participated

the study.

in

Individual

cally more effective than group feedback.

difficulty of applied research

feedback proved to be dramatiEmmert also discussed the

industry and the many obstacles which

in

are beyond researchers’ control, particularly the constant turnover
and

changes

in

shifts which make

it

difficult and sometimes impossible to use

control groups or reversal designs.

Posting a feedback graph

in

the spinning department of

a

textile

operation was enough to decrease the number of high bobbins on each of
four shifts (McCarthy,

1978).

was found for each department.

Initially an average of 55.9 high bobbins

After posting the graph with the number

for each shift, the first goal of reducing high bobbins to twenty per

shift was reached
12 per

shift and

in

a

two weeks.

Later on high bobbins were reduced to

new goal of 3 was set up.

Feedback removal resulted

32
in

an increase In high bobbins.

The research Indicates that knowledge
of one's performance
improvement and awareness of number of
errors often seem to be enough
to
maintain the behaviors needed for better
resuits.
However, the smail

number of studies and the difficulties
acknowledged

in

controlling all

the confounding variables suggest the
need for more research regarding
the effectiveness of feedback.
the present study:
dure

in

This

is

precisely one of the goals of

to test the effectiveness of a simple
feedback proce-

reducing hazardous conditions.

The preceding illustrative review of the use
of behavior modiflca^
tion

in

industry does testify to its effectiveness

related behaviors

in

in

Industrial and business settings.

modifying workBoth feedback and

other forms of positive reinforcement have been successfully
used to
increase various desirable behaviors,

safety purposes will now be reviewed

The use of these procedures for
in

detail.

Behavior modification and safety

As mentioned earlier, behavior modification techniques seem parti-

cularly appropriate for modifying safety-related behaviors, improving
hazardous conditions, and measuring the effectiveness of such efforts.
Yet,

for any number of reasons, the use of behavior modification

areas of safety has lagged behind Its use
Pierce,

in

May,

1977,

In

in

the

other areas of Industry.

failed to locate any report of the use of behavior

analysis for safety purposes.

The articles available until then,

in

fact,

either referred to theoretical considerations of the role of reinforcement
schedules

in

learning safe and unsafe performance (Altman,

1970) or to
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the relationship between
efficiency and injury aycidance
as measured
simulated conditions CMcKelvey,
Engen S Peck, 1973).
Later

in

1977,

in

however, several programs were
reported which seem

to be the first examples of
the application of behavioral
principles to
safety concerns.
Pierce himself reports the use
of a multiple baseline
experimental design across settings
in an institution for
retarded adults
(1978).
Although this does not refer directly
to the industrial setting,
it

is

ples

historically important:

Pierce clearly followed behavioral
princi-

his program and measured the
effects of the introduction of

in

environmental change,
Usian (1977)

accident reduction

i

ntro<juced a positive reinforcement
program for

in a

major shipbuilding facility with
20,000 workers.

The safety target behavior was the number
of injuries that occurred

while performing a job task.
After

a

The subjects were

detailed task analysis,

12

it was found that

first line supervisors.

protective devices were

not consistently worn even though clearly
mandated by company policy.

Also, fewer than 10^ of the supervisors wore
safety glasses.

Positive

reinforcement training focused on increasing the number of
times the
workers who reported to the
devices.

It

12

was assumed that

chosen supervisors wore their safety
if

safety device wearing behavior increased,

related injuries would decrease.

Treatment consisted of introducing individual training
cement principles to the

12

experimental subjects.

In

reinfor-

The goal of the initial

training phase was to learn to observe behavior and record

It.

The super-

visors first attended classroom explanations on the type of behaviors to

observe and record, and were then followed around by

a

trainer who coached

34

their recording of "wearing
behavior."

The second phase called
POMOST

for Positive Motivational
Safety Training,

lasted 28 hours and
^phasized

the reinforcement of safety
device wearing behaviors.
Data were collected through
hospital

logs.

The main "effect" of

treatment was to be the reduction
of injuries to hands and eyes
of the
workers who reported to the 12 trained
supervisors.
To measure effects
of wearing of protective devices,
after training sessions, random observations were done of the incidence of
wearing gloves and glasses for
each of the eight experimental crews.

untreated crews for two weeks.

Similar observations were made of

Also, subjective assessment was made
of

five environmental factors which
supposedly were related to frequency
of

injuries.

These factors were:

noise,

I

ighting, temperature, house-

keeping, and line control.

According to Usian the relations between all

injury frequencies

and training was significant, so he concluded reduction
was related to

training program.

He reported a "strong relationship" between training

and the incidence of hand and eye injuries.

The frequency of wearing

safety devices of experimental crews was far higher than the
untreated
crews.

According to Usian, this

of the training program.

is

another confirmation of effectiveness

Finally, the number of injuries did not seem to

be related to the five mentioned environmental

variables.

Usian added an interesting analysis of the relationship between the
success of a safety program and management’s involvement

in

it.

He

stressed the importance of clear communications between top managers and
line workers, and the need to analyze the actual

menting any specific program.

situation before imple-

He also emphasized the need to determine
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what is reinforcing for a particular
group of workers to make any
program
effective.
He underlined the flaws of implementing
programs on the

assumption that what is reinforcing for

a

particular group of workers

is

also reinforcing to every other worker.
Komaki, Barwick, and Scott (1977) reported
the use of a behavioral

approach to improve worker safety
turing plant with 162 workers.

in

two departments of a food manufac-

During initial observation

it

was found

that very little positive reinforcement was
given for safe performance,
and very few aversive consequences followed unsafe
behaviors.

Thus,

desired safety practices were identified and observational
codes for

on-the-job performance were developed.
Initially, observations were made of safe and unsafe on-the-job

practices three to four times

a

week for 25 weeks,

Intervention con-

sisted of presentation and explanation of desired behavior to the workers
and frequent feedback.

During a 30-minute training session, the workers

were shown pairs of slides presenting incidents of safe and unsafe performances.

Desired procedures were stressed.

of safety performed

Thereafter the percentage

incidents was graphed and posted

in

each department,

and supervisors were encouraged to recognize incidents of desired perfor-

mance,
A multiple baseline design across groups was used.

weeks (19 observations)

intervention was Introduced

Once intervention had been implemented for
ment and three weeks
i

in

12

weeks

After five

in

one department.

in

the first depart-

the second, a reversal phase was instituted.

ng this phase only observations were recorded,

but no feedback was

Dur
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given,

During baseline, employees
were performing safely at
least 2/3 of
the time, with an average
of 70* and 77.6* of safety
performance for each
department.
After intervention, percentage
of safe behavior went up
to
95.8* and 99.3* respectively, and
during reversal period, down
to 70.8*
and 72.3*.
These results clearly show the
Impact of the behavioral
intervention and confirm once more the
effectiveness of such procedures.
Ritschl. Mirman and Hall

(1977) reported the use of
a multiple baseline

research design to measure the
effect of an incentive program
and supervisory training in positive
and corrective feedback on
the rate of lost
time due to injurious accidents
in a chemical plant.
The incentive program called Protective Poker
allowed every employee to draw
a poker hand
from a complete deck of cards
each month contingent upon the
employee's
no lost time record for that
month.
According to the best 10 poker hands,
ten winners were chosen. The
supervisors participated in the incentive
plan
ard.

their department’s severity rate was
below

If

a

predetermined stand-

Supervisory training consisted of two
2-hour sessions on positive

and corrective feedback on workers’
safety performance.

Although the study has not been completed,
results of the first
group suggested that the program was having
an effect on employees’
rates.

The control group’s rates remained relatively
unchanged.

authors discussed the results
trial

In

light of the constant turnover

settings which may affect experimental outcome.

Injury

The
in

indus-

They also sustained

that their data do not support the assumption that
new employees are res-

ponsible for high rates of injuries.
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Sulzer-Azaroff (1978) reported the
successful use of a system of
feedback plus recommendations for
ameliorating hazardous laboratory
conditions at a university Materials
Science research institute.
this research was not carried out

in

for the purpose of this project
lies

the industrial setting,
in

Although
its value

showing the effectiveness of a

simple, non-Intrusive system to improve
safety conditions.

Sulzer-Azaroff used
in

31

laboratories.

was measured over
ing medium or

a

multiple baseline design across settings

First the type, frequency and location of
hazards
six week baseline period, and

a

laboratories display-

low hazard frequencies were assigned to
an early, middle

or late treatment group.

Written feedback consisted of inspection forms

and a set of suggestions for remedying the hazards.

The results showed that introduction of feedback was paired with
a

marked improvement

effectiveness of

a

in

safety conditions.

simple, cost-efficient system for safety purposes.

A replication of such a system

cha

I

I

The author stressed the

in

the industrial setting becomes

a

enge.

Rationale for Current Investigation

Four main Ideas can be extracted from the material presented
above, which are the foundation for the present research project.

They are:
1.

Industrial accidents are a serious health problem according

to the rate of deaths and injuries
2.

in

the work setting.

More theories than applied programs have developed from the

38

concern about safety and there

major scarcity of reports on

is a

program effectiveness.
The use of behavior modification techniques

3.

setting has shown promising results.

in

the industrial

particular, feedback on per-

In

formance has been an effective procedure.
The use of behavior modification procedures for
safety pur-

4.

poses
is not

in

the industrial setting is

very extensive,
(a)

it does

training supervisors

a

developing area.

Although research

suggest the following:
in

reinforcement principles to increase

safety-related behaviors increases such behaviors (Uslan,
(b)

1977);

training plus feedback of safe performance increases such performance considerably (Komaki et al.,

1977);

simple feedback system can reduce hazardous conditions

(c) a

significantly (Su zer-Azarof f
I

,

1978).

The goal of this project was to build upon the extant behavioral
research and expand the application of behavior principles

purposes

in

the industrial setting.

for safety

Two main questions were answered

with the development of this study:
1.

Is

it

possible to design and implement an effective, simple,

minimally intrusive safety program which

is

economical of time and money

and thus apt to be supported by management?
2.

Is

it

possible to measure the effectiveness of

program designed to reduce hazards

in

a

safety

the work setting?

The present study drew upon the research which had demonstrated
the effectiveness of feedback for safety purposes

in

the industrial

39

setting (Komaki et al.,

Azaroff, 1978).

1977) and

In

the academic environment (Sulzer-

However the study placed

a

main emphasis on the contin-

gency network of the organizational
structure and thus incorporated the
safety program to the management level.

The next chapter details the specific
procedures used
study.

In

the

CHAPTER

II

METHOD

Subjects

Six production supervisors of the main
plant of

organization participated
Appendix

in

the experiment,

small

a

A consent form

industrial

(see

A) was distributed to them by
the Personnel Manager before

observations started.
Table 3 summarizes the subjects’ characteristics.
seen,

As can be

four women and two men formed the supervisor
group.

ranged from 23 to 60 years.

Only the supervisor

in

Their ages

department number

4

had sales responsibilities in addition to
supervision.

Other than the supervisor for department number
3, all supervisors
participated

in

the study throughout.

A management decision to change

the supervisor for department number 3 occurred

in

the ninth week of

the experiment, prior to implementing the feedback system
ment.

in

this depart-

The new supervisor was then given pre-treatment explanations,

asked to participate and to sign the consent form.

supervisor for department number 3 presented

in

The data for the

Table

3

are the data for

the new supervisor.

Personne

Experimenter

.

The experimenter, a woman with

a

background both

in

applied behavior analysis and industrial management, conducted and

coordinated the research project.

The experimenter’s participation
40
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the different stages will be
described

—

observers, ages

students

In

21

in

the procedure section.

and 24, were two male, undergraduate

psychology with previous technical experience

behavior analysis procedures.

in

applied

One of them, who did the daily criterion

observations, was paid on an hourly basis.

The second observer volun-

teered his services as a reliability observer,
approximately once weekly.
Managers.
in

The Personnel, the Production and Materials
Managers, all men

their twenties, cooperated actively

in

the definition of hazards and

the implementation of the feedback system.
The Personnel Manager functioned as the coordinator
between the

experimenter and any company official.

He participated In the develop-

ment of the safety check list, provided company historical
data on types
and seriousness of accidents, wrote announcements to workers,
explained

feedback system to each supervisor, distributed copies of feedback forms
and contributed ail

information he considered relevant for the success

of the program.

Both Production and Materials Managers developed specific sugges-

tions to modify hazardous conditions and were involved
tation.

in

their implemen-

Either the Production Manager or the Personnel Manager distribu-

ted the feedback form.

The Vice-President, son of the owner of the company, participated
as a reinforcement agent by giving verbal

visors when the number of hazards
been considerably reduced.

in

praise to the department super-

their respective departments had

43

Sa fety committee

.

Ten members formed the committee,
the six supervisors,

the Personnel Manager, the Set-up
supervisor, the Chief Engineer and
a
Machine Shop worker. The committee
had existed for four years.
Its main
role was to conduct unannounced
monthly inspections to identify existing
hazardous conditions in each department.
After inspection a written memo
notified each department's supervisor
of the
identified hazards.

After the experimenter met with the
committee to explain the goals
of the research project,
the committee stopped meeting, assuming
without

foundation, that the experimental
observations would serve as
ttite for

a

substi-

their role.

The Personnel Manager, the Chief Engineer
and the machine shop

worker participated
initial

in

the definition of hazards and elaboration of
the

safety checklist.

Also, several times, the experimenter asked for

their individual advice regarding how to deal with

a

particular hazard.

Occasionally the mentioned safety committee members were
also responsible
for supervising the implementation of changes.

Sett ng
i

The study was conducted

in

a

private industrial organization that

developed and manufactured custom fabricated products.
a

New England town of approximately 3Q,Q00 people.

employees, working
in

in

three different locations.

It

was located in

The company had 230
The study was conducted

the main factory where management offices were also located.

However,

the safety program dealt only with the conditions of the plant and did not
include managers' or clerical offices.
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The plant had

a

working space of 26,000 square
feet (see Figure

I)

and was divided into six major
production departments, a machine
shop,
a dark room, a developing
production department and a dining room
area.
Each department was assigned a
supervisor reporting directly to the

Production Manager; the Production
Manager,
General Manager

(.See

in turn,

reported to the

Figure 2).

Only the si^ departments that participated
directly
tion process were included

in

the safety project.

Shop nor the dark room were included

in

in

the produc-

Neither the Machine

the safety program due to varia-

bility in work load and practical problems.

Departmenta

structure and schedu es

l

I

.

Of the six departments, three

were physically enclosed by brick walls or fence
wiring and open walkways
enabled one access from one department to another.

The other three were

open areas separated from each other by storage racks.

Walkways and

aisles were clearly marked by yellow lines on the floor (See
Figure

I).

Table 3 illustrates the size, number of machines and main function of
each department.
Each department had its own set of hazards.

For instance, due to

their location, some departments had no fire exits to keep clear, nor
flammable materials closet to keep closed or machines to guard.

departments
present.

1

and 3 was there the potential

Departments

5 and

6 did

Only

in

for all the hazards to be

not use any industrial machinery requir-

ing guards.
All

production departments operated from 7:30 a.m. to 3:30 p.m.

during the summer, and from 8 a.m. to

4 p.m,

during the winter.

Depart-
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ments 2, 3 and 4 also had

second shift from 3:30 to

a

occasions where the work load required

it.

II

p.m. on certain

A separate group of workers

was assigned to each shift.
Each week workers were given their
departmental assignments.

Ap-

proximately eight percent of the workers changed
departments each week.
The supervisor assigned work every morning
according to the production
plan received from the Production Manager.

Apparatus and Materials

Observation Forms:

1.

of a list of

dix

B

).

18

hazards and

The observational recording sheet consisted
map of each department's layout (See Appen-

a

Since each department had

separate form for each.

vations for departments

5

a

and 6 on one sheet.

Weekly data summary chart:

2.

different floor plan, there was

was possible, however, to combine the obser-

It

4,

a

A

chart with the list of hazards

and the daily total observed in each department (see Appendix C

)

was used

to summarize every week’s data.

Feedback/suggestion forms:

3.

letterhead.

It

The feedback form was on company

stated the frequency of hazards recorded on

day compared with previous feedback.

a

particular

Congratulatory or encouraging com-

ments were added when hazards had either decreased or increased respectively.

An observation form was attached,

indicating the type and loca-

tion of the hazard and suggesting ways of ameliorating those problems
(see Appendix

D

for example).
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Dependent Variables

Throughout the experiment measures were
taken of frequency, type,
and location of hazardous
conditions found

in

each department as defined

by the hazard checklist and map
in the observation form.

Using OSHA terminology and hazard
classification,

hazardous conditions was developed.
Each major category was subdivided

a

list of

18

Hazard definitions follow below.
into its component hazard

list

because altering a condition required the
participation of various people,
as a function of the type of hazard.

it

was very Important, for example,

to separate obstructions of working
material from obstructions of waste.
In

the first case, feedback would go to the
supervisor and Production

Manager;

in

the second case,

it

would go to the supervisor and Materials

Manager.

Hazard Operational Definitions

1.

Obstruction of wa

I

.

ki ng-^worki ng

surfaces by:

A.

Working material: Material that is being presently used
by workers to accomplish their on-going task.
This may
include raw materials, pieces in progress, finished products or any tool that workers require to perform the Job.

B.

Cleaning equipment: A
the elements used to clean the shop,
such as brooms, brushes, buckets, etc.

C.

Waste:
Anything that is left over by work, whether it has
been placed on gray dumpsters or is thrown to the floor, or
any boxes, pieces of paper, etc. that are left overs.

D.

Skids and pallets: Any skid or pallet that has nothing on
If working material is on them, they are considered
working material and recorded as one obstruction per skid
or pallet.

I

top.

I

49

E.

Unused equipment;
Equipment or parts of equipment that
IS not presently being used
to perform the present job,

sprinkler obstructed:
If there is anything
on the floor, in the yellow colored
area near the exits or^
sprink er or ladders or reclining in such
a way so as to prevent climbing ladder or reaching sprinkler.

Hazardous materials:
A,

Flammable liquids not identified or left open;
If name of
liquid is not placed in outer part of can
or if can is left
open

B,

Flammable materials closed door open:
completely or slightly open.

C,

Door to closet

is

Rags in improper can: Cleaning rags soaking in
flammable
liquids are placed in any container other than the
tight
covered special cans for them.

Materials storage:
A.

Leaning stack: Materials have been stacked in a way that
all
the stack or parts of it stick out and are leaning the
length of a palm or more.

B.

Foot obstacles or materials Jetting into aisle or walkway:
Materials in storage marked areas, resting on the floor are
sticking out beyond yellow line more than the length of a
palm.

Machine guarding:
A.

Guard removed;
mach ne,

Guard has been temporarily removed from

i

B,

Guard misplaced: Guard has been placed in such a way that it
is possible for the worker to put his hand or fingers in an
area where machine could harm them.

Electrical

hazards:

A.

Knockout off;

B.

Socket uncovered;

C.

Socket damaged:

D.

Socket overloaded:
each socket.

Knockout of socket

is

missing,

Socket has no cover.
Socket

is

broken or out of place,

More than one plug has been plugged

in
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E.

Other:
any other electrical hazard or electrical
related
problem such as wires hanging low, split wires,
etc.

Observation

Data were recorded five days
ing the day,

for 12 weeks.

shift while the plant was

3;30 p.m.

a

week at randomly chosen times dur-

Observations took place during the first
in

full operation, anytime between 8:30 a.m. and

Each observation session lasted from

15

to 20 minutes.

Ini-

tial iy, observations were going to be done at one specific
time, but due

to changes in the production process, major differences were
observed

between mornings and afternoons, so it was deemed important to observe at

different random times

observations.

Also,

if

in

order to obtain

a

more representative sample of

supervisors knew the observation time

they could prepare for the observation, thereby invalidating

in

advance,

it.

To con-

trol this even further, the starting point of each daily observation was

decided by the toss of

a coin.

The observer began by filling the date and his name

vation form.

in

the obser-

The main observer, who functioned completely alone three

of the five times a week, would walk around each department observing

the existence of the different hazards.
each hazard as he found it.

the end of

it,

He would not stop and record

Rather, he would walk down an aisle and at

away from the locale, would record the actual hazard.

he had any doubts, he would go back and clarify them.

This procedure

was designed to prevent the workers from noting exactly what was being

recorded
Each hazard was first recorded on the map using as

a

code the

If
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Roman numeral and letter which Identified
indicating its frequency of occurrence.

it on

the list, and

For example,

were three obstructions of working material.

lA 3

a

numeral

meant there

After each observation

session, the observer totaled the frequency of hazards within each cate-

gory

in

the upper part of the observation form and totaled all hazards

for each department in the lower part of the form.

Since there were only one set of observations each day, hazardous conditions, enduring products of hazardous behaviors were selected.

Since hazardous behaviors occurred so infrequently,

it seemed

sonable to record the physical evidence of the behavior.

more rea-

Also,

it was

easier to assess the permanent product for reliability of measurement
CSu zer-Azarof f & Mayer,
I

1977).

If,

for example,

a

machine guard had

been removed, both observers could easily identify and record it as a

hazard.

Whereas the corresponding hazardous behavior of putting

a

hand

or fingers in dangerous sections of machines might very well be overlooked during an observation session.

Yet the possibility of an accident

was still present.

Observer training

.

The observers were blind as to the nature of the

treatment variable Cwritten feedback and corrective suggestions) and
were not aware of the introduction of the experimental phase.
Since the observers had previous experience

in

behavior analysis

recording procedures, training consisted of Identification and recording
of each particular hazard,

The experinienter first gave the observers

written information on OSHA standards to familiarize them with terminology and types of hazards.

Then the observers informally walked around
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the plant to become comfortable with the setting.
Each written operational definition was reviewed with
observers

and also discussed at the site.

Observers were presented with examples

of type and number of hazard classification, and any questions
were

answered.

For example,

top of the other,

if

two boxes were obstructing an aisle, one on

1A2 should be recorded because one box could be re-

moved after feedback and that fact should be reflected
forms.

If

a can

in

the feedback

containing flammable liquid was obstructing an aisle

and was also open,

was to be recorded as both lA

it

1

and as

MIA

1,

To obtain reliability of scoring method, after explaining the
form to both observers and discussing the definitions, the experimenter

walked with them around the plant while
ly.

in

operation scoring cooperative-

The goal was to make sure they all understood what was supposed to be

recorded and how.

Four trial observations

in

which both observers and

experimenter scored independently took place, until an
level

was reached.

agreement

each of these trial observations, disagreements

In

were discussed and both the list and the definitions were refined.

Observers were instructed to interact as little as possible with
supervisors or workers,

When observers were asked by company personnel

what they were doing, they could show them the data collection sheet or

observation form.

Any further questions were referred to the Personnel

Manager or the experimenter,
The observers were also asked to record each observation as
had never been there before.

hazard

in

any area as

if

in

if

they

This meant observing and counting every
the previous sessron

it had

not been there.
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This was to prevent overlooking
changes

in

areas where conditions were

almost always identical, and
to control "observer drift."

Re

I

i

ab

i

I

i

ty

Inter-observer agreement of frequency,
type and location of hazard
was assessed during the
experiment by having the two trained
observers
or one observer and the
experimenter record data simultaneously
twice a
week.
The two observers walked down the
aisles, one behind the other,

scoring independently.

After recording the hazards for each
department,

the two observers would stop and
compare their observation forms.

With-

out changing the scoring on the forms,
they would discuss disagreements
and

in

some cases, go back to the hazard to
clarify its type or category,

frequency and location.
The experimenter would calculate the reliability
coefficient for
each department’s observation after the
observation session.

The formula

used was;

number of agreements
number of agreements plus disagreements

X

1

00

The number of agreements was the smallest number of hazards
per

category between the two observers.

The number of disagreements was the

difference between the larger and the smaller number of hazards per
category.

An example is contained below;
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Hazards

Observer

1

Observer

Agreements

2

Disagreements

I

I

A
B

10

8

C

5

6

5

D

2
4

2

2

3

3

E

8

2

20

F^e

I

{

ab

i

I

i

ty =

20
20 t 4

X 100 = 83^

Design

A single subject, multiple baseline design across subjects (Baer,

Wolf & Risley,

1968) was used to assess the impact of the independent

variable Cfeedback and corrective suggestions) on the frequency and type
of hazards.

Essentially this design permits replication of the interven-

tion over different subjects at different times.

The advantages of this

type of design over the group comparison approach prompted its selection,

According to Hersen and Barlow (1976) these advantages are:
I,

Ethical considerations:

The procurement of safety

objective of any organization for all
holding
ees,

a

treatment that

is

its members,

is a

primary

Permanently with-

believed to enhance the safety of the employ-

for the sake of experimental control group requirements, would be con

sidered unethical since we could be exposing the non-treatment group to un
safe conditions that could have been modified.
2,

Practical problems:

The group comparison requirement of
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assembling a homogeneous sample of employees

in

terms of age, sex,

experience, etc. would have required modifications

in

the work distribu-

tion of the organization, which would have been impossible.
3.
in

Averaging of results:

Due to the importance of identifying

what specific departments the number of hazards were very
high and

which were low and how each was modified by treatment, results averaging
would have obscured individual departmental outcome.
4.

Intersubject variability:

Group approaches only deal with

between-subjects variability and sometimes variability
ences among subjects.

is

due to differ-

Since with this design the same subjects were

observed during all treatment phases, this type of variability was under

contro

1

Baselines were recorded on the frequency and type of hazards of
all

six departments.

tested with Group

I

The effect of the independent variable was then
- Early Feedback Condition

(Departments

and 2),

I

while baseline conditions were continued with the other four departments
(see Figure

3).

This sequence was replicated with Group

Feedback Condition (Departments

4 and

Condition (Departments 3 and 6).

5)

and'Group

III

-

II

-

Middle

Late Feedback

The object of this type of design

is

to

show that regardless of time, the dependent variable changes substantially

when and only when the independent variable

is

delivered (Souweine,

1976).

After a baseline period of three weeks, feedback and corrective

suggestions were delivered twice
six weeks Group

nine weeks Group

II

a

week to supervisors

in

Group

1.

After

started receiving the bi-weekly feedback and after

111

began receiving treatment conditions.

Each phase is
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PRE-TREATMENT

BASELINE
1

FEEDBACK-SUGGESTION

FOLLOW
UP

1

1
1

1

1

1

Condition

1

1

1

1
Feedback

1

1

1

1

Early
1

1

^
1

1

1
Condition

1

1

1

-|
1
Feedback

1

1

1

1

Middie

1

1

L

1 1 11 1

1
Condition

1

1

1
Feedback

1

1

1

Late

1

Figure 3.

Experimental Design:

Multiple Baseline Across Subjects
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described

In detail

below.

Several criteria were followed in the assignment
of the supervi-

sors to the first feedback condition.

On the one hand, the frequency

of hazards per department was considered.

hazards was extremely dangerous,

it did

Although none of the existing

seem important to start with

those departments where frequency of hazards was higher.
choosing among departments

I,

2

or 3.

On the other hand, one of the

concerns of an across subjects multiple baseline design
in

one group may influence change

in

This meant

the others.

is

that change

To control this, the

two departments that were physically close together and were apt to
interact more frequently were chosen for the first feedback condition.

The supervisors were requested not to communicate to the others about
the feedback.

The assignment of the supervisors to Groups
random.

II

and

111

was done at

Initially Supervisor for Department 3 was to belong to Group

II,

as a function of his department's ranking with respect to other depart-

ments.

However, management was beginning to consider changing this super-

visor, so a random choice seemed appropriate.

The size of the departments

and the sex of the supervisor were also controlled by using a random

selection procedure.

Procedures

After

a

baseline period during which data were collected on the

type and frequency of hazards per department, the supervisors were sub-

mitted to the treatment condition of feedback and corrective suggestions.
A pre-treatment phase was necessary to define hazards,

establish record-

58

mg

system, train supervisors and
become famiiiar with setting.

A more

detailed description follows.

Pt~6~treatment phase

^tablishinq

a

site.

The son of the owner of the company
who was

involved in business with a mutual

menter.

It

friend was contacted by the experi-

was established that the company had

was interested

were explained.

evaluating

in

it.

a

safety program and

The major goals of the research project

The experimenter assured the company's
owner that the

intervention would

in

no way interfere with production.

observers was clarified.

It

The role of the

was agreed that any interaction between the

experimenter or observers and company personnel would
be through the
Personnel Manager.

It

was also specified that the experimenter would not

expect to receive any financial compensation from the
company.

The bene-

fit for the company was to be the establishment of

feedback

a

functional

system to modify hazardous conditions.

Meeting with safety committee

.

Once the Personnel Manager distri-

buted a general announcement (see Appendix

E

)

explaining the future visit

of the experimenter and the observers, a meeting was held
with the Safety

Committee.

The experimenter explained the general goals of the experi-

ment without mentioning the specific type of treatment.

She specified

that the two observers would record the frequency of hazards found

in

each

department according to the guidelines of the Committee and OSHA standards.
Initial emphasis would be placed on

identification of hazards and

some specific changes would be suggested,

later on

The cooperation of the committee
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members

identifying hazards was encouraged,

in

Ge^nerating the ha zard checklist

After working hours,

.

a

tour of

the plant was given by the General Manager and
the Personnel Manager.
Some possible hazardous conditions were pointed
out.

Then

in a

meeting

with the Personnel Manager, a summary of accidents
and injuries for the
past two years was provided.

An analysis of these data showed that cuts

and bruises were the most frequent type of injuries and
they usually

occurred to new employees who had been working for an average of
3 to 6

months

in

the company.

department.

No pattern was observed according to the Job or

An analysis of the safety committee’s inspections revealed

the most frequently reported hazardous conditions.

This was used to

develop a preliminary list of hazards.
As previously mentioned, with the combined cooperation of one of

the most active safety committee members, one of the observers, and the

experimenter each hazard was defined

operational terms, reliable

in

observation forms were developed and the two observers trained.
The pre-treatment phase lasted about one month, during which

there were two to three visits per week.

This period served the purpose

of al lowing workers to adapt to the obtrusiveness of the presence of the

experimenter and observers.

Although the employees were accustomed to

the occasional presence of visitors

in

the plant, seeing the same people

visit and take notes every day was unavoidably intrusive.

Also, the

general announcement mentioned previously and the supporting comments of

the Personnel Manager and the supervisors served to reduce reactions to
the presence of experimenter and observers.

It

is

assumed that the length
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of the baseline period served
to control

Base

I

i

this problem.

ne phase

During this phase, safety inspections
took place once

times

week, except for weeks 4,

a

5

and

II

a day.

five

when only four inspections

were conducted.

During baseline the experimenter
accompanied the observers at
least twice a week to make sure
definitions were adequate and that the

recording system was functioning properly.
minimal

Contact with subjects was

.

After reporting to the Personnel Manager,
the observers would
start data collection either with Department
number 4 (see Figure

Department number

In

I.

the first case. Departments

and then Departments 3, 2 and

I.

In

5

I)

or

and 6 followed,

the second case, the order was

reversed, ending with Department 4.

After

14

observation sessions

(3

weeks)

It

had been collected to start the treatment phase.

not completely stable.

It

was decided enough data

Although the data were

was difficult to continue the baseline period

any longer since some type of Intervention was expected.

believed that

If

In

Also,

It

was

three weeks the data did not show any consistent

pattern, nor stabilized, they probably were not going to.

During the first week, some workers approached the observers

asking who was going to analyze the data and
productivity.

If

it was

related to their

Observers answered by showing them the obseryation form.

The removal of certain hazards followed, specially obstructions of walking-
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working surfaces

departments 2 and

In

By the end of the second week,

4.

the workers stopped asking questions of the
observers.

Feedback-suggest ion phase

Before deciding which two departments would be assigned
to Group

I,

the first treatment group, two meetings were held with
the Production
and Personnel Managers.

very specific and clear.
tional

support,

it

was determined that suggestions should be

To give the feedback administrative organiza-

was decided that the Production Manager should distri-

bute feedback forms.
a

It

It

was also decided to give feedback twice a week,

schedule more liable to be continued once experimenting was over and

the permanent feedback system establ ished.

Group

I

- Early Feedback Condition

.

After discussing specific

solutions with the Production Manager, the experimenter wrote up the

feedback-suggestion form.

The form was modified by the Personnel Manager

and approved by the Production Manager.
A meeting was held with the supervisors from Departments

separately.
system

in

asked to read the form to make sure

it

First the supervisors were

was clear.

they would be receiving similar forms twice

themselves.

and 2

The Personnel and Production Managers explained the feedback

the presence of the experimenter,

answered.

1

a week.

Then they were told

Questions were

Finally the supervisors were requested to keep the system to
They were asked not to discuss

it

with the other supervisors

nor the observers.

Feedback-suggestion forms were almost always given on Tuesdays and
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Fridays with respect to Monday's
and Thursday's inspections,
respectively.
The high frequency of Waste
and Unused Equipment
obstructions,
resulted in a meeting with Materials
Manager to suggest solutions.
It
was decided that he should
always receive a copy of the
feedback-suggestion form. Also, the set-up
person and the Chief Engineer
received

copies of the feedback suggestion
form when their cooperation was
needed
+0 implement the change.
After receiving the feedback, the
supervisors mentioned that certain areas

in

their departments were not their direct
responsibility.

With the authorization of Production
Manager, the supervisors were given

the responsibility for the safety of
these areas.
The forms which took about seven minutes
each to prepare, were
given to the Personnel Manager who made the
necessary number of copies,
and the original was giyen to the Production
Manager to distribute to the

supervisors.

Occasionally, however, the Personnel Manager would distri-

bute it himself.

The treatment conditions

in

Group

I

seemed clearly to develop an

awareness of hazardous conditions at the management level.

Materials Manager took the initiative of calling

a

the introduction of treatment to Group

II

fact, the

meeting with all the

superyisors at the end of the second treatment week.
need to keep aisles clear from obstructions,

In

He emphasized the

This unplanned event delayed

for an additional week.

Until

data returned to previous baseline levels, treatment would not be intro-

duced with Group

Group

II

I

-

I

Middle Feedback Condition.

After three weeks of treat-
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ment conditions

to supervisors
Group

in
in

Group

Group

I,

feedback-suggestion forms were distributed
The same procedures were foi lowed
as for

ii.

I.

When feedback alternatives were
discussed, the Production Manager
mentioned to the experimenter that certain
hazards could not be changed,
For example, certain obstructions
were unavoidable due to the lack of
space.

The supervisor could not modify these
conditions.

Since

it

was

believed that the supervisors could eventually
contribute to the modifi-

cation of hazardous conditions by insisting
on change at the management
level,

it was

decided to continue giving feedback and
suggestions on

these type of hazards, acknowledging the difficulty
of trying to modify
them.

Group

- Late Feedba ck

111

ing treatment conditions

started

in

Group

were followed.

111.

in

Group

Condition

.

Three weeks after introduc-

the feedback-suggestion system was

II,

The same procedures mentioned for Groups

1

and

I

I

Extra time had to be spent explaining the on-going
pro-

gram to the supervisor

in

department

3

since he had recently been promo-

ted, was not aware of the program, and had never belonged to
the Safety

Comm ttee
i

Treatment conditions were implemented

in

Group

III

for

|3

days,

over a period of three weeks.
Fol low-up

.

Two fol low-up sessions were done after data had been

collected for the three feedback conditions.

The first one, three days

after the last experimental data collection session, and the second, two
weeks later.
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A meeting was held with all

the safety committee members and the

company vice-president to explain the whole program and
to present the
results.

The need for continuation of the program was stressed.

After

explaining group and individual graphs of the results, questions
were
answered, and
It

a

tentative program was determined to continue the program.

was decided that two volunteers from the safety committee should be

trained by experimenters on the recording system.
were to be done once
before experimental
a

a

Since observations

week instead of once a month (as had been done

Intervention) the volunteers were to rotate twice

month.

The experimenter trained the two initial volunteers following
the same procedures for observer training described previously.

CHAPTER

III

RESULTS

The data, collected for

a total

of 57 sessions over a three-

month period, demonstrated the effectiveness of
Intrusive feedback system

in

a

simple and minimally

reducing hazardous conditions

participating production departments.

six

in ail

Summary data for the six depart-

ments during baseline and treatment phases are presented

in

Table

4.

Figure 4 presents the frequencies of hazards per department
throughout

the experiment.

The results were similar for all departments

in

that

the mean frequency of hazards decreased from baseline to treatment conditions.

However, decrease

in

hazard frequency was much more marked

in

four of the six departments, as will be described below.

During baseline the mean frequencies of hazards

one and two (Group

was 30.1 and 28.8.

I)

remained approximately at baseline levels.

a

a

low of 21

high of 44 and 45 respectively.

and
In

15

departments

They decreased to 13.2 and 5.7

respectively during treatment phase, while frequency

baseline varied from

in

Groups

in

II

and

Ml

The range of hazards during

for departments one and two to

department one

a

downward trend

was observed during baseline, which continued during treatment.

The

hazard frequency range during treatment varied between five and 22 for

this department, and reached baseline levels on three occasions.
in

While

the first three baseline sessions the average of hazards was 39.3,

the last three sessions this average fell to 12.6.
the feedback-suggestion phase was paired with

number of hazards

in

a

The initiation of

rapid decrease in the

department two which remained at
65

a

low

level

in
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Total hazard frequency per department.
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throughout.

Frequency of hazards

once to baseline levels, and

in

this department only increased

in

this case only to the lowest frequency.

The range varied between 0 and 16 during
treatment.

The average number

of hazards during the first three
baseline sessions was in this case

24.3, and

it

dropped dramatically to

treatment sessions.

a

low of 2.6 in the

last three

Measuring the degree of dispersion of the data

about the mean, and using the average absolute value of
the difference
between the mean and each data poi nt cref erred to as the
"measure of

dispersion henceforth), both departments one and two show
change.

a

substantial

Over the baseline period their measures of dispersion were

5

and 5.5; they dropped to 2.86 and 5.7 respectively during treatment.
In

Group

the mean frequency of hazards for departments four

II

and five, was 13.2 and 14.8 during baseline, and it decreased to 8.4 and
1.8 respectively during feedback-suggestion phase.

In

both departments,

after Initiation of treatment, hazard frequency decreased rapidly.
ever, on the whole, the decrease in hazards was much greater

ment five than

in

department four.

in

How-

depart-

The average of hazards during the

first three baseline sessions was 9.3 for department four and 29.6 for

department five;
respectively.

in

the last three sessions this average was

The range of change

9

and

1.66

hazard frequency went from a low

in

of six and four to a high of 20 and 35 for departments four and five

respectively during baseline.
between four and zero to

13

and

During treatment the range of each varied
14.

The measure of dispersion

these departments shows important changes.
of dispersion was 3.6 and 6.89, and

it

in

both

During baseline the measure

dropped to 1.84 and 1.57 respec-

tively during the feedback-suggestion phase.

During sessions

19 and

3z
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both new material was delivered
and a new large shipment had to
be

prepared.
in

An increase in hazard frequency
can be observed in Figure

these two sessions.

4

Also after session 19 (labeled X) a management

meeting was held with all supervisors
emphasizing the importance of
keeping the company clean.
in all

A temporary decrease

departments followed that meeting.

initiation of treatment

Group

in

11,

in

frequency of hazards

Simultaneously with the

talk on the increase of hazards

a

was given by the Production and Materials Managers,
to supervisors

Group III.

A reduction of hazards in Group

session 29 (labeled Y).
inventory was carried out

I

1

in

can be observed after

I

During session 48 (labeled Z) a general

the whole plant.

in

An

can be observed during this session, especially

in

increase in hazards

departments two,

three and five.
The mean frequency of hazards
(Group

111)

in

departments three and six

decreased from a baseline level of 38.6 and

9.9 respectively during treatment conditions.

varied during baseline from

a

14

to 12.9 and

The Tange of hazards

low of 24 and 8 to a high of 55 and 24

respectively, and during treatment from zero and four to 33 and 20.

Once again, the reduction

in

hazard frequency was greater

department, department three, than

in

the other.

after treatment started, hazard frequency rose
session to baseline levels.

In

in

In

in

one

department six,

the second treatment

department three, hazards decreased con-

siderably when feedback-suggestion phase started and

a

downward trend

was observed throughout treatment and maintained during follow-up.

Hazard frequency increased slightly during session 48 when general
inventory was being performed, as mentioned previously.

During the first
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three baseline sessions the average
of hazards was 26 for department
three and nine for department six;

in

the last three sessions this

average fell to 3.3 and five respectively.
in

The measure of dispersion

these two departments, contrary to the
results shown

shows an increase

in

the treatment sessions.

increased from a baseline level of 5.59 to 9.4

department six from 3.72 to 4.43.

In

in

in

the others,

department three it
treatment, and

In

(This was most probably due to the

fact that the treatment period was substantially
shorter for these

departments.

Although the mean hazard frequencies dropped during treat-

ment, the duration of the phase probably was not long enough
to permit

the data to stabilize.)
The arrows
given.

in

Figure 4 Indicate the days when feedback was

As previously mentioned, feedback referred to the previous obser-

vation session; when data were recorded for the following session, the
supervisors had not necessarily yet received the feedback.
bably accounts for some delays

in

(This pro-

decrease of number of hazards.)

When data were analyzed according to type of hazards, the obstruction of walking-working surfaces accounted for a great majority of hazards
in

every department.

greater

in

Thus the reduction concomittant with treatment was

this category than in the others.

frequency of each hazard category

example of this change.
a

in

5

illustrates the

department one, serving as an

On the contrary, electrical hazards did not show

major change, as can be seen

were observed

in

Figure

in

the same figure.

the other departments.

Similar results
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SESSIONS
Figure

5.

Hazards per category

in

department

!.
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Interobserver reliability

Interobserver reliability was calculated
at least once
and sometimes twice a week; a
total of

formed.

16

The mean percent of agreements between
observers across the

93^; department 2: 98%; department 3:

90%.
level

week

reliability checks were per-

weeks of data collection for each department
was as follows:
I:

a

9256;

departments 4,

Overall observer-experimenter reliability was
of 83^ and a highest of

100? agreement.

Table

9455,

5

with

department
5,
a

and 6:

lowest

presents the

variance between observers for each reliability session.

Table

5

Minimum and Maximum Percent Agreement Between Observers

Session

1

3
5
7
14
21

28
35
37
42
44
47
49
52
54
57

Minimum

%

91

89
84
88
83
85
88
91

83
88
90
86
91

93
95
98

agreement

Maximum % agreement

100
98
98
99
89
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
99
100
100
100

12

CHAPTER

IV

DISCUSSION

The effectiveness of

a

simple, minimally intrusive, cost-efficient

feedback system was measured and demonstrated

In

this study.

The introduc-

tion of feedback as to amount, type
and location of hazards and the sug-

gestions on how to modify them were clearly effective
frequency

In all

CKomaki et al.,

departments.
1977;

in

reducing hazard

These results support previous findings

Su zer-Azaroff
I

1978) on the efficiency of feedback

,

for safety purposes, and also the contention in the
management literature

(McGregor,

1968; Miles,

1975) that any Intervention must be backed up

with organizational support.

Once again the application of behavior modification principles
proved to be functional

implementation of

a

in

the industrial setting, specifically

safety program.

in

the

Frequent feedback, concrete suggestions

about how to modify hazardous conditions and congratulatory and encouraging comments appeared to decrease hazards considerably.

way speak for themselves.

However,

it

The results

in a

would be a mistake to assume that

the feedback and suggestions alone fully explain the success of the inter-

vention.

If

the organizational structure and the prevalent culture within

the organization had not been considered, analyzed and used, the results

might have been quite different.
back Important but

in

consider who provided
corporated

in

In

other words, not only was the feed-

order to implement the program successfully one must
it,

who was supporting the program, how was It in-

the daily routine,

its relation with production, and how

compliance with suggestions affected supervisors' status.
73

Furthermore,
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consideration of these organizational
conditions

is

also necessary

order to understand and explain the
differential effects
departments.

The behavioral

Intervention was general

departments; yet Its impact was different,
although
hazard frequency decreased.

differences

is

ly

in

in

In

the six

identical

In all

every setting

One hypothesis that could explain such

that the effects of the organizational variables
could

have been decisive

in

the outcome of the program.

analysis of two departments will

A brief comparative

illustrate this possible explanation.

Department One

The supervisor

in

this department followed through the suggestions

for which she had the sole responsibility.

decrease

in

hazards

in

her department.

This accounts for the major

However, whenever suggested

change required that she contact the personnel
failed to act upon the suggestion.

In

in

other departments she

fact certain modifications were only

implemented when feedback-suggestion copies were delivered to the other

people involved.

This

is

clearly seen after session 34 at which time

feedback was delivered to chief engineer and Materials Manager who then
proceeded to modify the electrical hazards that had been constantly
present.

Initially when the supervisor

in

department one received the first

feedback-suggestion form, her immediate reaction was:
same things we

had already been told about."

’’Oh,

these are the

This statement could be

Interpreted to mean that she knew what the hazards were, but she did not

believe they could be changed, or that she could change them, since they
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had not been modified in the
past.

Also, this supervisor seemed
to per-

ceive her main responsibility to
be production, with safety secondary
importance.

in

Apparently

in

her previous interactions with the
Produc-

tion Manager, production alone was
reinforced.

Since her production

quota was adequate, and she had been
considered an effective supervisor
for several years, she probably
saw no reason to go out of her way to
imp efnent clianges towards
I

The question
tional

level

is:

improving safety.

What else could have been done at the organiza-

prior to and during the implementation of the
program to

increase success?

Although it

is

true that

in

this department some

hazards, such as obstructions of certain material,
could not be avoided,

there is no question that hazards could have been further
reduced.

Per-

haps more clearly articulated support from the Production
Manager would
have made a major difference.

Had he emphasized the importance of both

production and safety conditions from the beginning, results might have
been even better.

Frequent follow-up meetings, presided over by Produc-

tion Manager and attended by other personnel,
tion of change, might also have helped.

It

involved in the imp lamenta-

seemed that this supervisor

•

needed more organizational support to follow through on suggestions, so

feedback itself

in

this department was comparatively less effective.

Whenever feedback was accompanied by intervention at the organizational
level, results were more effective, as observed, for example, after session
34

.

Department Two

The organizational background and present position within the
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company of the department two
supervisor probably combined with
treatment to account for the
impressive results obtained In this
department.
The supervisor had recently
been promoted to this position
when the
safety program was started.
She was eager to do a good job
and had not
yet had enough previous
experience to fail into a behavior pattern
In
which production seemed to be
the only important task.
Perhaps she saw

cooperation with the safety program
as a way to earn management's approval

and thus consolidate the stabilize
her position.

appeared to realize the importance of
safety.

considerably
and verbal

in

the process she

In

Since hazards decreased

her department she was frequently
reinforced with written

praise from the company's vice-president.

The changes

her

in

department were so marked that they evoked many
favorable comments.
On the other hand the management support that
this supervisor

received through the program helped her come
from other areas who were causing an increase
ment.

in

contact with personnel
hazards

her own depart-

in

She was able to "iron out" the differences and have the hazards

corrected.
results

in

in

This seemed clearly an effect of the program.

Perhaps the

this department exemplify more than anything else

a

mutual

interaction between behavioral program and organizational conditions.

These two examples Illustrate how the organizational variables may
have influenced the outcome of the behavioral

patterns were observed

in

Intervention.

the other departments.

It

is

Similar

also important to

emphasize that an effective intervention with an organization should
include a consideration of the structure of the organization.

illustrated by the way

in

This

is

which the program was originally implemented:

The "powerful" people were contacted first, their support was secured and
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both the formal and informal
organizational networks were
considered in
the introduction of treatment.
The literature on management
issues and
implementation of change (Beckhard, 1968)
suggest similar considerations.
Several other management considerations
need to be stressed.

For

one, choosing the supervisors as
the subjects was dictated by administra-

tive concerns.

If

supervisors are responsible for safety, they
not only

have to model correct performance but
also are apt to see to it that their
personnel follow safety standards.

This

consistent with the National

is

Safety Council principles ("Accident Prevention
Manual," 1968).

It

is

the supervisors (Incontrast to the workers) who
have the power to imple-

ment change, especially
a

program

is

if

interaction at other levels

instituted via the supervisors,

is

required.

its effects are enhanced.

This should not imply that direct intervention at the workers'
Komaki et al.,'s,

When

1977) would be ineffective.

Rather,

it

level

suggests

(e.g.

the

greater potential for working through the supervisors.
Any safety program probably should be incorporated within the

existing organizational structure so it has a greater probability of
being implemented and maintained.

In

gestions were given to the supervisor.

directly act upon suggestions

in an

this program, safety-related sugIt

was expected that they would

effort to make safety one more regu-

lar responsibility assigned to the supervisor instead of becoming an

adjunct program, developed by
people

is

a

separate group.

When a separate group of

assigned responsibility for safety, supervisory safety respon-

sibilities may be transferred to that group.

Since the safety group

is

not in a position to monitor as constantly as the supervisors, coverage
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would have to be mors
superficial.

Unfortunately, due to

a number of
factors including time
constraints and the external
position of the
experimenter, by the end of
the experimental phase, safety
had not

completely become the supervisors'
responsibility.
presentation of final results
and

Changes were observed
rn

In

in

However, during the

the follow-up sessions, several

the safety co^ittee members
which showed a shift

responsibilities from the committee
to the "line" employees.

For

one, the production manager,
who was not initially Involved
with safetyrelated problems, was the first
to volunteer to follow through
the

program.

He also expressed real concern
for its continuation, becoming

tively involved
a return

in

it.

Also when one member of the committee
suggested

to monthly inspections, the Personnel
Manager and some super-

visors clearly rejected this
point

is

favor of weekly inspections.

that the safety program became

ceased to be looked at as
al

in

a

a

The main

"line" responsibility and

"staff" function.

However, more organization-

follow-up would have been necessary to definitely
implement safety

as part of the supervisors’ Job description.

Critique of design and measurement system

Although the multiple baseline design served the purpose of per-

mitting a functional analysis of the intervention without requiring
reversal

a

period, the design itself seemed to occasion some problems.

When treatment was introduced to Group

I

the other groups remained

under baseline conditions, "blind" as to treatment procedures.

those conditions the supervisors

in

Group

I

seemed to develop

self-serving concern about their department’s safety.

Hazards

Under
a

very
in

their
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department were occasionally corrected at the
expense of other departments.

For example, obstructions were moved from
one department to

another.

Concern about safety became limited to one's
department,

rather than for the company as

a

whole.

when treatment was implemented with Group

Similar reactions developed
By the time Group

II.

was

111

included in treatment, a certain interdepartmental
competitiveness seemed

to have developed over safety concerns.

mote

a

lack of cooperation.

obviated

if

This competition seemed to pro-

Perhaps thrs problem could have been

the whole company had been considered as a single group and

treatment implemented

in all

departments simultaneously.

The other

plants belonging to the organization could have been used for replication
purposes.

In

cases where there

is

only one setting,

completely separated, the problem might not arise.

if

departments are

Otherwise, perhaps

replication could be conducted across two different companies.
To control

indirect, unplanned sources of variability such as

changes of supervisors, recruitment of new employees, arrival of new
material, production requirements,

inventories, etc., perhaps longer

phases would have been advisable.

However,

in

applied settings, as

Us an (1977) points out, one cannot wait forever until all those factors
I

are eliminated.

settings

in

This problem might be minimized by replication across

different locations.

generalization across settings.

Separate sites would also minimize
Although the need to keep other super-

visors uninformed as to the exact nature of treatment was stressed

in

each case, the reactions of the supervisors under baseline conditions

suggested that they may have become aware of the types of hazards being
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recorded (Figure

Sroup

4

illustrates a decrease in hazards
during baseline of

simultaneously with the introduction
of treatment

III

In

Group II).

However this change could also be
due to the meeting held between
managers and supervisors mentioned
above.

With respect to the measurement,

it was

clear

some cases that

in

using frequency as the main dependent
variable obscured the effects of

treatment.

In

certain departments, mainly departments

2,

4 and 6,

major changes implemented following feedback
are not reflected
data.

For example,

if

a

(requiring a major effort from several

people and the location of an appropriate place to
deposit

it) and a

box was put in its place, the recorded frequency
would not have

varied.

Yet feedback had been effective;

the danger was now minor.
in

the

very heavy piece of equipment which had
been

obstructing an aisle was removed,

small

in

some

the results.

Perhaps

the hazard

was removed and

This effect, however, would not be reflected
in

future work, a weighting system could be

developed whereby hazards are assigned different points according to

seriousness or potential to cause an accident or injury and perhaps to
location.

The biweekly feedback was probably more effective than the monthly
Inspections previously performed by the safety committee.

the committee's files, before starting the behavioral

In

analyzing

intervention, one

found that the same hazards were reported several times.

Some of these

were still present when the behavioral program was started.

Although

such hazards were not immediately modified, by the third or fourth time

feedback was given, change had been implemented.

The repetitiveness of

the feedback may have accounted for its effectiveness.

After experimental
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ervention, weekly feedback
was programmed with the
safety committee,
Follow-ap data would be
necessary to see if the shift
in schedule affected
hazard frequency or not.
Yet it could be anticipated
that week y w
be more effective than monthly
feedback.
I

i

I

I

Cost benefit analysis of
feedback-package system
Industrial management is primarily
concerned with production.

Thus, for any adjunct program
to be accepted,

it has

production or at least not affect it
adversely.

to either enhance

Our specific safety

program might not have increased
production directly (and that was not one
of its goals), but indirectly it
certainly favored production by reducing

hazardous conditions.

The primary value of the program was its
simplicity

and the ease with which it could be
incorporated in the supervisor's
rout ne.
i

Once hazards were identified and defined, which

major effort involved

in

15

it need not be

feedback at

a

inspected dal ly.

list of hazards and a map.

Not more

One or two departments can receive the

time, each day, and the very same observation forms can

The cost benefit

Indirect benefits

about several

a

minutes a day are required to inspect the whole area, and

also be used as feedback forms.
required.

probably the

the program, any person can carry out the inspec-

tions using a simple form with
than 10 to

is

.

is

No special apparatus or expertise are

quite evidently

a

very favorable one.

The implementation of the feedback system brought

indirect benefits that deserve separate mention.

Although

the company had an ongoing safety committee and major hazards had been
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corrected long before the experimental
program did appear to promote

a

intervention, the new safety

safety awareness among the employees that

had not been previously observed.

Both managers and workers seemed to

become increasingly conscious of safety hazards,
realizing that they

could correct the hazards.
safety responsibilities.

They appeared to become more aware of their
At the management level, this was observed

in

the increase of meetings dealing with safety-related issues
and the

active involvement of the production manager after the program
was completed,

At the worker level

it

was evident

in

their constant efforts to

correct hazardous conditions and their questions about safety standards
posed to the experimenter.

Safety issues seemed to have acquired an

important status and as mentioned previously, safety became

line

a

function
In

departments two, four and five, several ’’housec ean ng" effects
I

were evident following the introduction of treatment.

i

To be able to

correct obstructions of working material, several ’’untouched" areas were
Inspected and cleaned.
found.

Boxes of irregularly finished products were

These were corrected and packed for shipment.

Raw materials were

put back in circulation; unused equipment was used or stored properly;

machines that needed replacement or were to be removed were finally
Changes

taken care of.

in

were finally implemented.

machine layout that had long been planned
The awareness of space value increased as

a

consequence of the safety program.
Since

in

order to eliminate certain hazards the supervisors needed

the cooperation of other personnel,

were solved.

long

lasting

Interaction problems

The reduction of hazards became important enough for the
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supervisors to work out communication problems
which had existed for
long time.

a

department 2 for example, to replace machine
guards, get

In

rid of unused equipment and clear aisles
of obstructing material, the

assistance of set-up personnel had to be solicited.

Due to previous

difficulties with set-up chief, the supervisor had
decided to ignore
these hazards; but when the supervisor realized their
correction was her

responsibility and that she was being held accountable for this,
she
negotiated solutions with the set-up people.
also increased their cooperation.

departments

5

Feedback to those personnel

Similar effects were observed

in

and 6.

Suggestions for future research

Several changes for improving the present program have already

been suggested:
1.

That the program be implemented simultaneously throughout

a

whole organization, using other organizations or settings for
replication purposes

in

order to avoid the negative effects

of competition that were pointed out previously.
2.

Maintain phases for longer periods of time.

3.

Modify the measurement system, since there are important
effects of the program which are not reflected
data.

in the

frequency

A weighted frequency could provide a more valid reflec-

tion of change.

Other topics for future research that evolved from the present
study might include:
I.

Incorporating safety responsibilities within supervisors' job
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descriptions and setting up a
reinforcement program through

management for meeting this responsibility.
2.

Adding hazardous behaviors to the
list of hazardous conditions
in the

safety program and appointing the
supervisor the

observer and reinforcement agent and
reinforcing accomplishment of this task.

Komaki et al.'s (1977) study suggests

supervisors can be effective agents of change

in a

safety

program.
3.

Designing a safety program that requires regular
reevaluation
and redefinition of hazard check list.

Hazards change and

when some are corrected, others may arise, which
might not
have been included originally.

(The very process of conceptu-

alization of hazards may Itself promote awareness).
4.

Incorporating the workers

the safety program by posting

in

results of feedback system as suggested
(Feeney,

1972;

Komaki

etal.,

in

other studies

1977).

The relation between this study and Su zer-Azarof f
I

research

In a

'

s

(1978)

university sciences laboratory deserves special comment

terms of generalization issues and suggestions for future research.
critical concern

in

behavioral

the results may be limited.

research

is

that the general izabi

The effectiveness of

a

I

in

A

ity of

particular treatment

could for example, be due to the specific conditions of the setting, or
to the characteristics of the experimenter.
becomes very valuable

in

these cases.

Systematic replicafion thus

As SIdman (I960) pointed out

"every successful systematic replication demonstrates that the finding
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question can be observed under
conditions different from those
prevailing in the original experiment"
(p. IM).
This study constituted
such a systematic replication,
as conditions were not identical
to
in

Sulzer-Azaroff’s.

Under different conditions

it did

replicate the use

of a simple feedback-suggestion
system and was also successful
ing hazardous conditions.

in

reduc-

Even though the setting and the people
Involved

were different, treatment produced the
same results, thereby supporting
the conclusion that the feedback system
has powerful controlling properties.

One can therefore have Increased confidence
that this system will

be effective again when used in other
settings.

Additional systematic

replications would further increase the external validity
of the findings.
In

terms of future research the systematic replication
did demon-

strate the power of the feedback despite variations

in

procedure.

How-

ever, there are aspects of the various conditions that
prevailed In the

two studies that deserve further attention.
could affect the outcome
study,

further replications.

In

Su zer-Azarof f
I

'

the present study, feedback was delivered twice a week.

both cases, hazards decreased.

optimal

In

laboratory heads received feedback approximately once every three

to four weeks.
In

In

The frequency of feedback

At this point one might search for

frequency of feedback conditions,

i.e., what frequency of feed-

back is associated with more rapid and/or enduring results.
A similar question can be raised about the frequency of data

collection and the timing of inspections.

In

the present case, data were

recorded daily and the subjects usually saw the observer.
sity case, data were collected

in

each

In

the univer-

laboratory once every three to

four weeks and the lab heads rarely saw the observer.

These variables
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could be partialed out In
future research to probe for
their differential
effects. The extent to which
observers might function as
discriminative
stimuli for correcting hazardous
conditions and The frequency of
data
collection may systematically
affect change and should be studied.

Neither of the studies partialed
out the mediator of feedback,
"who" delivered the suggestions,
nor the inclusion of reinforcing comments.
These aspects also varied between the
two studies.
In the

present study, the production and
personnel managers were identified as
the authors of the feedback suggestions,
whereas
safety committee communicated the
suggestions.

in

the other study the

Long term evaluations of

this factor might determine how the role
of the mediator might produce

differential effects.

Encouraging and congratulatory comments regularly
were used
this study but only irregularly

in

the Su zer-Azarof f study.
I

in

Since both

showed Improvement, one might be led to the conclusion that
such comments

might not add anything substantial to the results.
industry (Feeney,

1972)

extremely effective.

Previous research

has also shown that feedback alone can be

However,

it

is

not l^nown whether the addition of

approving feedback would have promoted further improvement
Azaroff (1978) study, or

in

if

its omission

in

in

the Sulzer-

the present study may have

reduced the effectiveness of the intervention.

Additionally, approval

could have positive collateral effects, towards the safety program and
its staff;

future research should consider measuring such side effects.

Consequently, what seems clear for future research

is

the need to evaluate

each component of the program separately to determine the relative effec-

tiveness of each.

However, considering the demands of applied settings
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this may not always be feasible.

The major question at this
time

is

how to achieve long term
effectiveness of the present system.
In

summary, this study contributed both
to the field of industrial

safety and to the use of behavior
modification principles for management
purposes.

As mentioned previously there is a
lack of reports on the

measurement of the effectiveness of safety
programs.

This project

specifically implemented a safety program and
measured its impact on the
frequency of hazards.

more that

a

On the other hand, this study demonstrated
once

learning theory approach is useful

related problems because

it

in

analyzing management-

focuses its attention on some critical vari-

ables which make it effective.

These variables are among others the

selection of dependent and reliable variables (consequences of
overt
behavior) and the reinforcement contingencies to implement the treatment

effectively.

The choice of these critical variables for safety-related

purposes was effective and thus permits one to think that

it

would also

be successful

is

then, one

in

other management-related problems.

This

further step for building what can be called organizational behavior
management.

That

is,

principles to fulfill

a

management field that uses behavior modification

its goals.
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APPENDIX A:

Consent Form

As was announced a couple of weeks
ago,

with the University of Massachusetts

in a

cooperating

is

research project on Industrial

Safety.
You probably have been the representatives
from U. Mass, that

have been walking around the plant observing our
safety program and
rts operation.

hazards.

They will be recording the number, type, and place of

The information collected will be shared with all the employees

and the whole analysis will be made available to be used

in

improving

the safety conditions at work.
it

is

our sincere belief that studies such as these are beneficial

to continue improving the safety conditions of our company.

your participation is very much appreciated.

Consequently,

Should you wish, you may

elect not to participate and are free to withdraw your participation.

I

have read the above and consent to participate.

hazards will be recorded, but this

in

I

understand that

no way will affect my situation in

the company.

Signature

Print your name
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APPENDIX

B:

Sample of Department Observation Form

DEPARTMENT
DATE;

OBSERVER:

HAZARD;
I.

Obstruction of walking-working surfaces by;
A.
Working material
B.
Cleaning equipment
C.
Waste
D.
Skids & Pa ets
E.
Unused equipment
Exit, ladder or sprinkler obstructed
Hazardous materials:
A.
Flammable liquids not identified or open
B.
Flammable materials closet door open
C.
Rags in improper can
Materials storage:
A.
Leaning stack
B.
l-oot obstacles or materials jetting into
aisles or wa kways
macn ne guard ng:
A.
Guard removed
B.
Guard misplaced
El ectrical hazards:
A.
Knock-out off
B.
Sockets uncovered
C.
Sockets damaged
D.
Sockets overworked
E.
Other
’

^

I

^11.
III.

IV.

^

~

I

'

1

1

i

INDIVIDUAL DEPARTMENT MAP
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APPENDIX D:
Samples of Feedback-Suggestion Form

TO:

Department 4 Supervisor

From:

Production Manager

Subject:

SAFETY

Date:

June

16,

&

Personnel Manage

1978

The staff and management of

want to stress the

importance of your active participation

in

maintaining safety standards.

We appreciate every- effort you make for this.
Eleven hazards were recorded

yesterday's inspection, one more

in

than in last Monday's inspection.

Please read the suggestions

in

the form attached and let us know

how we can help you reduce the hazards.

102

TO:

Department 2 Supervisor

From

Production Manager

Subject:

SAFETY

Date:

June 20,

&

Personnel Manag

1978

We were extremely pleased to find no hazards
within your working
area!

Congratulations!

Only one obstruction was found

in

the back

aisle that can easily be put under the storage racks, away
from the
aisle.

We must stress once again our appreciation for your continued

efforts to maintain high safety standards.

According to yesterday’s

inspection, you reached the lowest level up until now; your previous
level

was three hazards.

Do keep it up!
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TO:

Department

From:

Production Manager

Subject:

SAFETY

Date:

June 30,

5

Supervisor
&

Personnel Manager

1978

The staff and management of

must congratulate you

once again for maintaining high safety standards
Only one obstruction was recorded
than

in

last Monday's

"perfect place,"

inspection.

in

in

your department!

yesterday's inspection, one more

We realize it

is

difficult to keep

but we must recognize that your area looks pretty

clear and safe almost always.

Do keep it up and

let us know whenever

you encounter any problems in maintaining safety conditions
at top
I

eve

I

a
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TO:

Department

1

Supervisor

From:

Production Manager & Personnel
Manager

Subject

SAFETY

Date:

June 30,

1978

The staff and management of
to maintain good safety standards

appreciate your efforts
in

your department.

terday's inspection hazards were up again
to

14,

in

Although

in

yes-

Wednesday's inspec-

tion they had been considerably reduced, and
changes towards improving
safety conditions were evident.
In

yesterday.

We hope you can keep this up!

the form attached you can identify the hazards recorded
Some of the obstructions are difficult to modify, for

example, the drying racks occupy

a

lot of space.

However, other hazards

can be easily changed by simply placing them within the working area,
for example the tables, can and waste basket marked with an *.

Also,

the exit can be cleared very easily by removing the black dumpster from
the exit area and placing it two feet away.
We hope you can implement some of these suggestions to reduce the

amount of hazards

in

your area.

Do let us know how you can be helped

further to continue reducing hazards.
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TO:

Chief Engineer, Machine Shop

From

Production Manager & Personnel
Manager

Date:

July

Subject:

SAFETY

14,

1978

As you know, we have been carrying
out dally safety inspections
of every department in the company
and giving bi-weekly feedback on the

type and number of hazards to the
supervisors.
From the beginning of this project,

it

was decided with the

Safety Committee’s advice, that the Machine
Shop would not be included
in

the safety program since it was difficult to
identify certain hazards

for the following reasons:
-

The machine shop has no drawn walkways

-

It

is

constantly changing, and

- The personnel

However,
several

in

were considered very "safety" aware.

the observations of the Receiving Department, we have found

hazards that cannot be corrected by this department, but rather

require your intervention.
On the form attached you can identify the hazards recorded

yesterday’s inspection.
walkway.

Most of these are obstructions of

a

in

major Exit

Some equipment with sharp edges has been left at the very

entrance from the Shipping Department; the acetylene tanks and hose are

obstructing the aisle; the ladder area, although tidier than before,
still

not completely clear.

is

Most of these hazards can be easily correct-
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ed.

Perhaps the equipment can
be put at the left hand
side of the
entrance where there is space
available.
would also like to ask your
cooperation in correcting hazards
in

other departments.

guard has been removed;

For example,
in

in

the Polaroid Department a machine

the Screening Department one
socket has a

knock out off and another is
overcharged.
We certainly appreciate any effort
you make to help maintain

safety standards

in

your area and

in

other departments of the company.
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APPENDIX

E:

Safety Program General
Announcement

NOTICE

All emp oyees

'

I

Personnel Manager
SUBJ ECT

Safety

:

«tll be cooperating with the
University of Massachusetts
in a

research project covering Industrial
Safety.

During the coming weeks, representatives
will be visiting our

company to obtain information on our
safety program and to observe the
overall operation of it.

This research project should prove mutually
beneficial to the

University and

.

While the survey representatives obtain the

information needed for their project, we will
be furnished the results of

their observations so that we may continue to
improve the overall safety

operations of our company.

I

request that each individual offer their

ful

this project.

Thank you

cooperation to

